GHSA-PXH3-4QQV-58MG
Servo Sandbox bypass: declarative refresh can auto-navigate a sandboxed iframe
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-PXH3-4QQV-58MG divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
A sandboxed iframe can auto-navigate itself via declarative refresh even when automatic features should be blocked. This allows attacker-controlled embedded content to redirect itself without user action.
### Summary
Servo allows a sandboxed iframe to auto-navigate itself via declarative refresh in configurations that should block automatic features.
The issue reproduces in the must-block rows of the matrix:
- `sandbox=""`
- `sandbox="allow-same-origin"`
- `sandbox="allow-forms"`
- `sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms"`
This is a client-side sandbox-policy bypass. It does not by itself prove script execution or parent DOM access, but it does let attacker-controlled sandboxed content redirect itself without user action.
### Details
The declarative refresh path is missing sandbox enforcement:
- [components/script/dom/document/document.rs:239] `RefreshRedirectDue::invoke()` contains `TODO: check sandbox`
- [components/script/dom/document/document.rs:4522] the refresh scheduler contains `TODO: handle active sandboxing flag`
The implementation currently schedules and executes the refresh without enforcing the sandboxed automatic-features restriction described by the HTML spec comments in the same code.
What I observed:
- In Servo, the must-block rows above navigated successfully.
- In Chrome, the same rows were blocked.
### PoC
Serve the HTML files in this folder over HTTP.
Files:
- child.html https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27770907/child.html
- success.html https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27770910/success.html
- viewer.html https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27770911/viewer.html
Steps:
- Open `viewer.html` over HTTP.
- The page shows a visible sandboxed iframe.
- In a correct browser, the iframe stays on `child.html`.
- In Servo, the iframe visibly turns into the `success.html` page.
### Impact
This is a client-side sandbox-policy bypass.
Confirmed impact:
- autonomous iframe self-navigation in sandbox configurations that should block it
- framed phishing / content swap after initial render
- redirect loops / annoyance / limited DoS
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.ioservo |
Corregida | 0.3.0 | — | — |
0.3.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61713https://github.com/servo/servo/security/advisories/GHSA-pxh3-4qqv-58mghttps://github.com/servo/servo/pull/45116https://github.com/servo/servo/commit/70df09e72f40fab45493ffee3821e7a1a31ae4d2https://github.com/servo/servohttps://github.com/servo/servo/releases/tag/v0.3.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
