GHSA-Q2J8-X8HF-63CH
Grav: Single invalid UTF-8 byte disables every rule in Security::detectXss(), bypassing the page-content XSS safety gate
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-Q2J8-X8HF-63CH divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Vulnerability Details
Component: getgrav/grav core
File: `system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php`
Function: `detectXss()` (all six entries in the `$patterns` array use the PCRE `u` modifier), invoked from `Grav\Common\Data\Validation::checkSafety()` (the save-time XSS gate for any non-`security.xss_whitelist` account's blueprint field, including the page `content` field) and `detectXssInEditorContent()` (the render-time backstop for GHSA-2c4f-86xc-cr74)
CWE: CWE-79 (Stored XSS), root-caused by CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation — fails open on malformed input)
Severity: High
CVSS: 8.0 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
### Relationship to prior advisories
This project's `detectXss()`/`checkSafety()` stack has been patched at least three times for the "page editor without super-admin rights stores an event handler that runs for site visitors" bug class: GHSA-9695-8fr9-hw5q / GHSA-c2q3-p4jr-c55f / GHSA-w8cg-7jcj-4vv2 (unquoted-attribute bypasses), GHSA-269c-h76q-8cxw (quoted-attribute-boundary bypass), GHSA-2c4f-86xc-cr74 (render-time Twig-assembled bypass). All three patched the regex logic. This is a different, lower-level defect: the PHP regex *engine* silently refuses to evaluate the pattern at all once the input contains one invalid UTF-8 byte, independent of what the regex logic says — no amount of regex-logic hardening fixes this.
### Root Cause
Every pattern in `$patterns` uses the PCRE `u` (UTF-8) modifier. PHP's documented behavior: if the subject string contains even one byte sequence that is not valid UTF-8, `preg_match()` does not "skip" that byte or report "no match" — it returns `false` for the entire call, with `preg_last_error() === PREG_BAD_UTF8_ERROR`. `detectXss()` only checks truthiness (`if (preg_match(...) || preg_match(...))`), so `false` and "0 matches" are indistinguishable to the calling code. A single stray byte anywhere in a field's value — not even near the actual payload — makes every one of the six checks silently report "no XSS found".
Meanwhile, a real browser decoding the same bytes as UTF-8 (the encoding Grav serves pages as) does not fail open: it substitutes the invalid byte with one U+FFFD replacement character and renders the surrounding markup completely normally. The `<img ... onerror=...>` tag is untouched structurally; the payload still fires.
Vulnerable Code
$patterns = [
'on_events' => '#<(?:"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|[^>"\'])*?(?:[\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/]|"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\')on\s*[a-z]+\s*=#iu',
// ... five more, all with the /u modifier
];
foreach ($patterns as $name => $regex) {
if (!empty($enabled_rules[$name])) {
if (preg_match($regex, (string) $string) || preg_match($regex, $orig)) {
return $name;
}
// ...
}
}
return null; // reached even when the string contains <img onerror=...>,
// as long as it also contains one invalid UTF-8 byte anywhereDirectly reproducible against the exact regex:
$regex = '#<(?:"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|[^>"\'])*?(?:[\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/]|"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\')on\s*[a-z]+\s*=#iu';
var_dump(preg_match($regex, "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>")); // int(1) -- caught
var_dump(preg_match($regex, "<img src=x \x80onerror=alert(1)>")); // bool(false), preg_last_error()==4### Attack Scenario
1. Attacker holds a page-edit ("publisher") account without super-admin rights.
2. Sets page content to `Hello world \x80<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>` (a raw invalid UTF-8 byte, deliverable via any non-JSON submission path — e.g. the bundled Form plugin's multipart/urlencoded field, or any blueprint-validated field populated from a raw POST body — `$_POST` values are not UTF-8-validated by PHP).
3. `Validation::checkSafety()` runs `detectXss()` on the value; every `preg_match()` call returns `false`, so `detectXss()` returns `null` ("no violation"). The payload saves unmodified.
4. Any visitor (including a super-admin browsing the public site) loads the page; the browser renders the intact `<img onerror=...>` element, executing the attacker's JavaScript in the visitor's session.
### Impact
- Type: Stored XSS (CWE-79)
- Auth required: Page-edit ("publisher") account, not super-admin
- Consequence: Arbitrary JavaScript execution in any visitor's browser, including a super-admin who views the page — a cross-trust-boundary escalation from publisher to admin-equivalent action capability.
Recommended Fix
public static function detectXss($string, ?array $options = null): ?string
{
if (null === $string || !is_string($string) || empty($string)) {
return null;
}
// Fail closed: mb_check_encoding() validates the whole string up front
// and returns a normal boolean — it never "fails open" the way a
// /u-flagged preg_match() does on malformed input.
if (!mb_check_encoding($string, 'UTF-8')) {
return 'invalid_encoding';
}
// ... rest unchanged
}`Validation::checkSafety()` only invokes `detectXss()` for accounts outside `security.xss_whitelist` (default `admin.super`), so this introduces no behavior change for whitelisted accounts.
### Verification
Dynamically confirmed on grav 2.0.13: called the live `Security::detectXss()` directly (bootstrapped through Grav's own service container, not a standalone regex copy) — a clean payload was correctly flagged (`"on_events"`), the same payload plus one invalid UTF-8 byte returned `NULL` (bypass), and an ordinary safe string returned `NULL` as expected. Note: the JSON REST API (`api` plugin, the path Admin2's SPA uses to save pages) happens to reject raw invalid UTF-8 before it reaches `detectXss()`, because RFC 8259 requires JSON text to be valid UTF-8 and PHP's `json_decode()` enforces this — that's an incidental protection of the JSON layer, not a fix, and any non-JSON submission path (e.g. the bundled Form plugin's multipart/urlencoded fields) remains exposed. After applying the fix above, the same bypass payload correctly returns `"invalid_encoding"` (a violation), while an ordinary safe string still returns `NULL` (no regression).
A ready-to-apply fix branch is prepared locally against this repo's `develop` branch (based on the `2.0.13` tag); happy to push it to a private fork once one is available for this advisory.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.14 | — | — |
2.0.14Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75834https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-q2j8-x8hf-63chhttps://github.com/getgrav/gravhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-stored-xss-via-invalid-utf-8-byteLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
