llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-Q3FF-CJ6V-RR5G

Grav's Clockwork profiler endpoint is unauthenticated: when the debugger is enabled, any visitor can read other users' session cookies, form submissions and the site's plugin configuration

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
8.7
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones1.7.53.3 · 2.0.22
Exposición79 dDesde la divulgación, 2 sept 2026, 5:16 p. m.
Detección77 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 4.0 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Esto huele a PoC esperando su momento.Revisa tus logs de la semana con la lupa.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 sept 26
11 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 sept 26
22 sept 26
12 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-Q3FF-CJ6V-RR5G divulgada · CVSS 8.7 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

When `system.debugger.enabled` is turned on, any unauthenticated visitor can read the stored profiler records of every other visitor's requests via `/__clockwork/...`. `InitializeProcessor::handleDebuggerRequest()` intercepts any path containing `/__clockwork/` during bootstrap and hands it to `Debugger::debuggerRequest()`, which performs no authentication of any kind: no user lookup, no IP restriction, and no Clockwork authenticator configured. The endpoint also supports anonymous pagination (`previous`/`next`) over the entire stored history.

With the shipped `censored: false` default, each record contains:

  • the raw request cookies, including Grav's session cookie -- whose value *is* the PHP session id, so replaying it resumes that user's session, including an authenticated admin's;
  • the full parsed request body. Clockwork's built-in password filter only inspects top-level keys, so Grav's own login form -- which posts `data[username]` / `data[password]` -- has its password stored in plaintext;
  • the site's entire system and plugin configuration, dumped into every record's log, which includes any secrets an operator has saved in a plugin's settings (SMTP credentials, third-party API keys, licence keys).

The `Authorization` and `X-API-Token` request headers are stored in every record and are *not* masked even when `censored: true`.

Records persist as plaintext JSON under `cache/clockwork/<id>.json`. Those files are not directly fetchable under Grav's shipped web server configs; the `/__clockwork/` endpoint is the only route to them.

Condition

`debugger.enabled` ships as `false`, so this affects sites where an operator has turned the debugger on. Grav's documentation and admin help text described the debugger only as "a useful tool during development" and did not warn that enabling it publishes every visitor's request data to every other visitor. That has been corrected alongside this fix.

On Grav 2.0, setting `provider: debugbar` does not avoid the issue: since 2.0.4 Grav forces the Clockwork provider for any request that prefers a JSON response, so an attacker who sends `Accept: application/json` reaches the same store. On Grav 1.7 the `debugbar` provider is unaffected.

Impact

An attacker starting with zero access ends up able to read every recorded request body and configuration value, and to impersonate any recorded session, including an authenticated super-admin's. Trust boundary crossed: an unauthenticated visitor reaches a privileged sink.

Patches

The `/__clockwork/` endpoint now answers only requests originating from the server itself, or requests presenting the secret configured in the new `system.debugger.token` setting. Cookies and credential headers are stripped from stored records regardless of the `censored` setting.

Workarounds

Set `debugger.enabled: false`, or block `/__clockwork/` at the web server or CDN. Existing profiler data should be removed with `bin/grav clear`.

Credit

Reported by @zuwardo-zero.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 1.7.0 < 1.7.53.3
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.0.22
1.7.0
1.7.53.3
2.0.0
2.0.22
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 1.7.53.3, 2.0.22 — —
Versiones corregidas1.7.53.32.0.22
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-q3ff-cj6v-rr5g

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.