GHSA-Q433-MP6C-8V4F
sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v0.1.2 | github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp · -31 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-Q433-MP6C-8V4F divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through `execute_query`, and SQL injection through `describe_table`.
Details
- Statement chaining in `execute_query`. The only check was that the query starts with `SELECT`. The `modernc.org/sqlite` driver runs every `;`-separated statement in one call, so anything after `SELECT 1;` ran unchecked.
- SQL injection in `describe_table`. The `table_name` argument was interpolated into `PRAGMA table_info(%s)` with no guard.
- Escaping read-only mode. Through either path, `ATTACH DATABASE` opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection's `mode=ro`. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.
Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from `ATTACH` reaching files other than the configured database.
Impact
- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.
The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on `:8080` on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.
Patches
Fixed in v0.1.2:
- `ATTACH` is disabled in the engine (`SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED` set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.
- Read-only connections set `query_only`.
- `execute_query` rejects input that contains more than one statement.
- `describe_table` passes the table name as a bound parameter.
Workarounds
Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.
Credits
Reported by @bebold6133.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp |
Corregida | v0.1.2 | -31 d | v0.1.2 no afectada |
0.1.2v0.1.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130008https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4fhttps://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/pull/112https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/1da5a6582a4f9d90c778db5687ddcd0c39d2c1echttps://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/3c244d61cc0a9c0cc5e4d74719c1dc83edcfa339https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcphttps://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
