GHSA-Q664-H4X6-PHXC
RSVP forgery via hardcoded ignore_acl=true in calendar_uiforms.ajax_status
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-Q664-H4X6-PHXC divulgada · CVSS 4.3 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
`calendar_uiforms::ajax_status($eventId, $uid, $status)` calls `set_status(..., true)` with a hardcoded 5th argument `$ignore_acl=true`, which short-circuits the ACL gate in `set_status`. Since `$uid` is fully request-controlled, an attacker with only READ access to an event can forge the RSVP status (Accept/Reject/Tentative) of any co-participant, and the change is persisted and notified.
## Root Cause
- `calendar/inc/class.calendar_uiforms.inc.php:3646` — `set_status($event['id'], $uid, $status, $date, true)`; the hardcoded `true` is `$ignore_acl`.
- `calendar/inc/class.calendar_boupdate.inc.php:2093` — gate `if(!$cal_id || (!$ignore_acl && !check_status_perms($uid,$event)))` is skipped when `$ignore_acl` is true, bypassing the `check_perms(Acl::EDIT,0,$uid)` requirement on the victim's calendar.
- `$uid` is request-controlled (not session-derived); `ajax_status` is dispatchable (starts with `ajax`).
## Impact
Forge Accept/Reject/Tentative for any co-participant (e.g. reject the organizer/manager out of a meeting), persisted and accompanied by spoofed notifications. Bounded: attacker needs event READ access, `$uid` must already be a participant, and only the participant status field is affected. Integrity-low.
## Proof of Concept
`json.php?menuaction=calendar.calendar_uiforms.ajax_status` with params `["<eventId>", <victim_uid>, "R"]`.
## Attack Chain
1. Entry: POST `ajax_status` params `["<eventId>", <victim_uid>, "R"]`. Guard: event READ ACL (`bo->read`, uiforms:3624). Bypass proof: attacker needs only read (participant or read-grant); `$uid` must already be a participant (uiforms:3641).
2. Sink: `set_status(..., true)` (uiforms:3646). Guard: `check_status_perms`/`check_perms(EDIT)` (boupdate:2093). Bypass proof: hardcoded `$ignore_acl=true` skips the gate entirely; no re-read with EDIT, no `session==uid` check.
3. Impact: forged RSVP for any co-participant + spoofed notification.
## Bypass Evidence
`$ignore_acl` is hardcoded `true` at the call site (uiforms:3646) and `$uid` is request-controlled. Code present on HEAD (uiforms:3646, boupdate:2093).
## Affected Versions
`<= 26.7.20260710.3`.
## Suggested Fix
Do not pass `$ignore_acl=true` from `ajax_status`; enforce `check_status_perms`/`check_perms(EDIT)` against the target `$uid`'s calendar, or restrict `$uid` to the session user.
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Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistegroupware/egroupware |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware/security/advisories/GHSA-q664-h4x6-phxcLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
