GHSA-Q88X-RVM8-WXP4
Path traversal in asset link endpoint — incomplete ../ guard allows cross-user asset file read
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 5.0.3 | geonode · -129 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-Q88X-RVM8-WXP4 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
GeoNode's asset download endpoint `GET /api/v2/assets/<pk>/link/<path>` joins the caller-supplied `<path>` onto
the asset's on-disk directory after an incomplete traversal guard. The guard only rejects paths containing
the substring `"/../"`, so a path that *begins* with `../` (no embedded `/../`) passes. Using a percent-encoded
`../`, an authenticated user who owns one asset can read files belonging to a different asset owned by
another user — including private asset contents — without authorization.
## Affected
- Project: GeoNode (`GeoNode/geonode`) — open-source geospatial content-management / spatial-data-infrastructure
platform, widely deployed by governments and agencies.
- Affected through v5.0.2 (latest shipped release). The guard (`geonode/assets/local.py:~269`), the
`os.path.join` sink (`~280`), and the storage-layer exception swallow (`geonode/storage/manager.py:320-326`)
are byte-for-byte identical between the `5.0.2` tag (`9349239`) and HEAD.
- Endpoint: `GET /api/v2/assets/<pk>/link/<path>`.
## Technical detail
The handler checks ownership/permission on the asset identified by `<pk>` (`get_perms_response`), then builds
the file path from `<path>`:
# geonode/assets/local.py (~line 269)
if "/../" in path: # incomplete guard — only blocks the substring "/../"
return HttpResponse(..., status=400)
...
# (~line 280)
full = os.path.join(asset_directory, path) # path joined after the guard; a leading ../ escapesA path such as `../<other-asset-dir>/secret.txt` contains no `"/../"` substring, so the guard does not
fire; `os.path.join` then resolves the leading `../` to a sibling asset directory, and the file is read and
returned. The permission check applies to the asset `<pk>` in the URL — which the caller legitimately owns — but
not to the file the traversal actually reaches, so ownership of one asset is leveraged to read another asset's
files.
The traversal must be percent-encoded (`%2e%2e%2f` for `../`) so the WSGI layer decodes it to `../` after URL
normalization and the view receives the raw `../` path.
## Impact
An authenticated user who owns any asset can read the files of any other asset on the instance — including
private assets owned by other users — by supplying a `../` path to the sibling asset's directory. For a
platform that hosts governmental and agency geospatial datasets with per-object permissions, this is a
cross-user confidentiality breach. CWE-22 (Path Traversal).
CVSS v3.1: 6.5 (Medium) — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`.
## Proof of concept
Reproduced locally on GeoNode v5.0.2 (the official `5.0.2` image) with two users and two assets:
# Account B owns LocalAsset pk=1 at .../assets/<dir_B>/secret_b.txt (content: PRIVATE_SECRET_USER_B_CANARY_XK7Q9P)
# Account A owns LocalAsset pk=2 at .../assets/<dir_A>/public_a.txt
# Account A is NOT a member/owner of Account B's asset.
# Control — Account A reads its own asset file:
GET /api/v2/assets/2/link/public_a.txt (Account A) -> 200
# Traversal — Account A reads Account B's private file via its own asset pk:
GET /api/v2/assets/2/link/%2e%2e%2f<dir_B>%2fsecret_b.txt (Account A) -> 200
body: PRIVATE_SECRET_USER_B_CANARY_XK7Q9PThe guard `if "/../" in path` evaluates `False` for the decoded path `../<dir_B>/secret_b.txt` (no embedded
`/../`), so it does not fire, and Account A receives Account B's private asset content. Full captures available
on request.
## Remediation
Replace the substring guard with proper containment enforcement: normalize the joined path
(`os.path.realpath`) and verify it stays within the asset's directory (e.g. `os.path.commonpath([base,
resolved]) == base`), rejecting any path that resolves outside the asset directory — rather than blacklisting
the `"/../"` substring. Reject leading `../` and absolute paths as well.
## Novelty
GeoNode has five published security advisories (two SSRF, a stored XSS, a Geoserver information leak, and an
XXE) — none covers this asset-link path traversal. There is no CVE/GHSA/OSV record for it. (Issue #12341
"Assets: link generation" is a non-security design discussion of how the endpoint builds links, not a report of
this traversal; CVE-2023-2336 is an unrelated Pimcore issue.) To the best of my knowledge this is previously
unreported.
## Credit
Please assign a CVE and credit Santosh Kumar Puppala — GitHub https://github.com/Santoshkumarpuppala.
Coordinated disclosure.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypigeonode |
Corregida | 5.0.3 | -129 d | 5.1.1 no afectada |
5.0.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/security/advisories/GHSA-q88x-rvm8-wxp4Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
