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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · geonode

GHSA-Q88X-RVM8-WXP4

Path traversal in asset link endpoint — incomplete ../ guard allows cross-user asset file read

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -129 d de la divulgación
Exposición15 dDesde la divulgación, 5 nov 2026, 1:11 p. m.
Detección13 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 5.0.3
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
29 jun 26
5 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
29 jun 26
4 ago 26
10 sept 26
16 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 5.0.3 geonode · -129 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-Q88X-RVM8-WXP4 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary

GeoNode's asset download endpoint `GET /api/v2/assets/<pk>/link/<path>` joins the caller-supplied `<path>` onto
the asset's on-disk directory after an incomplete traversal guard. The guard only rejects paths containing
the substring `"/../"`, so a path that *begins* with `../` (no embedded `/../`) passes. Using a percent-encoded
`../`, an authenticated user who owns one asset can read files belonging to a different asset owned by
another user — including private asset contents — without authorization.

## Affected

- Project: GeoNode (`GeoNode/geonode`) — open-source geospatial content-management / spatial-data-infrastructure
platform, widely deployed by governments and agencies.
- Affected through v5.0.2 (latest shipped release). The guard (`geonode/assets/local.py:~269`), the
`os.path.join` sink (`~280`), and the storage-layer exception swallow (`geonode/storage/manager.py:320-326`)
are byte-for-byte identical between the `5.0.2` tag (`9349239`) and HEAD.
- Endpoint: `GET /api/v2/assets/<pk>/link/<path>`.
## Technical detail

The handler checks ownership/permission on the asset identified by `<pk>` (`get_perms_response`), then builds
the file path from `<path>`:

# geonode/assets/local.py (~line 269)
if "/../" in path:                       # incomplete guard — only blocks the substring "/../"
    return HttpResponse(..., status=400)
...
# (~line 280)
full = os.path.join(asset_directory, path)   # path joined after the guard; a leading ../ escapes

A path such as `../<other-asset-dir>/secret.txt` contains no `"/../"` substring, so the guard does not
fire; `os.path.join` then resolves the leading `../` to a sibling asset directory, and the file is read and
returned. The permission check applies to the asset `<pk>` in the URL — which the caller legitimately owns — but
not to the file the traversal actually reaches, so ownership of one asset is leveraged to read another asset's
files.

The traversal must be percent-encoded (`%2e%2e%2f` for `../`) so the WSGI layer decodes it to `../` after URL
normalization and the view receives the raw `../` path.

## Impact

An authenticated user who owns any asset can read the files of any other asset on the instance — including
private assets owned by other users — by supplying a `../` path to the sibling asset's directory. For a
platform that hosts governmental and agency geospatial datasets with per-object permissions, this is a
cross-user confidentiality breach. CWE-22 (Path Traversal).

CVSS v3.1: 6.5 (Medium) — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`.

## Proof of concept

Reproduced locally on GeoNode v5.0.2 (the official `5.0.2` image) with two users and two assets:

# Account B owns LocalAsset pk=1 at .../assets/<dir_B>/secret_b.txt  (content: PRIVATE_SECRET_USER_B_CANARY_XK7Q9P)
# Account A owns LocalAsset pk=2 at .../assets/<dir_A>/public_a.txt
# Account A is NOT a member/owner of Account B's asset.
 
# Control — Account A reads its own asset file:
GET /api/v2/assets/2/link/public_a.txt                                   (Account A)  -> 200
 
# Traversal — Account A reads Account B's private file via its own asset pk:
GET /api/v2/assets/2/link/%2e%2e%2f<dir_B>%2fsecret_b.txt               (Account A)  -> 200
   body: PRIVATE_SECRET_USER_B_CANARY_XK7Q9P

The guard `if "/../" in path` evaluates `False` for the decoded path `../<dir_B>/secret_b.txt` (no embedded
`/../`), so it does not fire, and Account A receives Account B's private asset content. Full captures available
on request.

## Remediation

Replace the substring guard with proper containment enforcement: normalize the joined path
(`os.path.realpath`) and verify it stays within the asset's directory (e.g. `os.path.commonpath([base,
resolved]) == base`), rejecting any path that resolves outside the asset directory — rather than blacklisting
the `"/../"` substring. Reject leading `../` and absolute paths as well.

## Novelty

GeoNode has five published security advisories (two SSRF, a stored XSS, a Geoserver information leak, and an
XXE) — none covers this asset-link path traversal. There is no CVE/GHSA/OSV record for it. (Issue #12341
"Assets: link generation" is a non-security design discussion of how the endpoint builds links, not a report of
this traversal; CVE-2023-2336 is an unrelated Pimcore issue.) To the best of my knowledge this is previously
unreported.

## Credit

Please assign a CVE and credit Santosh Kumar Puppala — GitHub https://github.com/Santoshkumarpuppala.
Coordinated disclosure.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
geonode≤ 5.0.2
5.0.2
5.1.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypigeonode
Corregida 5.0.3 -129 d 5.1.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas5.0.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/security/advisories/GHSA-q88x-rvm8-wxp4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.