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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-QGMC-P8W7-7X5P

Grav 1.7: a user manager without super-admin access can take over a super-admin account from the classic admin Accounts page

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

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CVSS 3.1
7.2
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.7.53.11
Exposición2 dDesde la divulgación, 18 nov 2026, 7:42 p. m.
Detección7 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Mis orejas detectan algo raro por aquí.Hoy es tranquila, pero podría madrugarte.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
07:42 p. m.
04:56 p. m.
07:42 p. m.
01:01 p. m.
06:19 a. m.
11:38 p. m.
04:56 p. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QGMC-P8W7-7X5P divulgada · CVSS 7.2 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

On Grav 1.7, an account with the classic admin's user-management permission (`admin.users`) but without super-admin access can take over a super-admin account from the Accounts page. The page is served by Flex Objects in the default `grav-admin` bundle, and Flex user saves did not check whether the target account is a super admin. The manager can set a new password for the super admin (through the normal password field), write a password hash of their choosing into the account (`hashed_password` is not declared in the account blueprint and passes its loose validation), or delete the account. The edit form also hands the manager the super admin's password hash and any pending password-reset token as hidden fields.

The classic admin's own user form already refuses this (fixed for earlier reports), but that code path is not used when Flex Objects manages accounts, which is the default.

Affected versions

  • Grav core 1.7.0 through 1.7.53.10, with the classic Admin plugin and Flex Objects (the default `grav-admin` package; Flex Objects manages accounts by default). Reproduced on Grav 1.7.53.10, Admin 1.10.60, Flex Objects 1.3.8, Login 3.12.1.
  • Grav 2.x is not affected through this route: the classic admin does not run on 2.x, and the Admin2 / API user endpoints only copy known fields and refuse non-super managers on super-admin accounts. The same core guard and the hash filtering for Flex user saves shipped in Grav 2.2.13.

The original report gave the affected range as Grav 2.0.1 to 2.2.9. Those releases are fixed in 2.2.13 for the narrower 2.x path; the PoC's route (`/admin/accounts/users/<username>`, `task=save`) belongs to the classic admin and is live on the 1.7 line.

Details

  • `UserObject::isAuthorizedOverride()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Flex/Types/Users/UserObject.php`) let any account holding the user-management rule create, update or delete any other account, including super admins. Flex Objects' admin controller authorizes saves and deletes through it.
  • `FlexObject::update()` writes every key that survives `BlueprintSchema::filter()`. The account blueprint uses `validation: loose` and does not declare `hashed_password`, so a submitted hash was stored. `UserObject::save()` only replaces the hash when `password` is submitted, so omitting it keeps the injected value.
  • The classic admin's form template carries every undeclared account key back as a hidden `data[_json][...]` field, which put the target's `hashed_password` and `reset` token in the page served to the manager. With email configured, a manager can request a reset for the super admin through the public forgot-password form and read the token from the edit page.

The reporter's PoC, run against the Accounts page as a non-super `admin.users` manager:

curl -sk "https://<site>/admin/accounts/users/<super_admin>" -b "<manager_session>" \
  --data-urlencode "__form-name__=flex-user_accounts" \
  --data-urlencode "__unique_form_id__=<id>" --data-urlencode "form-nonce=<nonce>" \
  --data-urlencode "task=save" \
  --data-urlencode 'data[hashed_password]=<bcrypt hash of a known password>'

The same request with `data[password]=<new password>` instead also succeeds, and the edit page's `task:delete` link deletes the account.

Impact

A user manager without super-admin access can sign in as a super admin and gain full control of the site. Grav treats user management as stopping short of the super-admin tier, so this crosses a trust boundary. Severity is rated High: it needs an authenticated admin account with `admin.users`.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 1.7.53.11. Flex user saves and deletes now refuse a super-admin target unless the acting account is a super admin itself (own access or through a group), submitted `hashed_password` and session flags are ignored on update, and account credentials and one-time tokens are left out of the extra data that forms carry as hidden fields.

Workaround until upgrading: grant `admin.users` only to accounts you would trust with super-admin access.

Credits

Reported by @manus-pi.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.0/ 10Medio
Vector 5.0 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 1.7.0 < 1.7.53.11
1.7.0
1.7.53.11
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 1.7.53.11 — —
Versiones corregidas1.7.53.11
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-qgmc-p8w7-7x5p

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