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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-QH22-76GF-QWC4

SSRF filter bypass in Mastodon/Telegram/GroupMe/RadioReg webhook connectors (incomplete fix for GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4)

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CVSS
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high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición32 dDesde la divulgación, 18 oct 2026, 10:58 a. m.
Detección31 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 oct 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 oct 26
26 oct 26
3 nov 26
11 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QH22-76GF-QWC4 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

SSRF filter bypass in Mastodon/Telegram/GroupMe/RadioReg webhook connectors (incomplete fix for GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4)

Summary

The UserUrlFilter SSRF guard introduced in commit e9c4598 (Version20260807193430 migration) to fix GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4 was only applied to three of the seven webhook connectors that accept user-configurable URLs. The Mastodon, Telegram, GroupMe, and RadioReg connectors dispatch outbound HTTP requests to station-manager-supplied URLs without passing them through `UserUrlFilter::filterSensitiveUserUrl()`, bypassing the `filter_local_user_urls` protection entirely.

Affected component / versions

  • Package: AzuraCast/AzuraCast
  • Affected versions: all versions including the GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4 fix (tested against commit `e9c4598`)
  • Vulnerable files:
  • `backend/src/Webhook/Connector/Mastodon.php` (instance_url)
  • `backend/src/Webhook/Connector/Telegram.php` (api)
  • `backend/src/Webhook/Connector/GroupMe.php` (api)
  • `backend/src/Webhook/Connector/RadioReg.php` (webhookurl)

Details

Root cause (CWE-918)

The GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4 fix replaced the old `AbstractConnector::getValidUrl()` with `UserUrlFilter::filterSensitiveUserUrl()` in three connectors:

  • `Generic.php` -- FIXED
  • `Discord.php` -- FIXED
  • `MatomoAnalytics.php` -- FIXED

Four connectors with user-configurable destination URLs were not updated:

1. Mastodon.php (line 33, 49)

$instanceUri = Urls::parseUserUrl($instanceUrl, 'Mastodon Instance URL');
// ...
$response = $this->httpClient->request('POST', $instanceUri->withPath('/api/v1/statuses'), ...);

`Urls::parseUserUrl()` only validates URL syntax (scheme is http/https). It does NOT resolve the hostname or check if the IP is private/loopback/reserved. The `instance_url` field is entirely user-controlled.

2. Telegram.php (line 44-49)

$apiUrl = Types::stringOrNull($config['api'], true);
$apiUrl = (null !== $apiUrl) ? rtrim($apiUrl, '/') : 'https://api.telegram.org';
$webhookUrl = $apiUrl . '/bot' . $botToken . '/sendMessage';
// ...
$response = $this->httpClient->request('POST', $webhookUrl, ...);

The `api` config field defaults to `https://api.telegram.org` but is user-overridable. No SSRF filter applied.

3. GroupMe.php (line 43-48)

$apiUrl = Types::stringOrNull($config['api'], true);
$apiUrl = (null !== $apiUrl) ? rtrim($apiUrl, '/') : 'https://api.groupme.com/v3';
$webhookUrl = $apiUrl . '/bots/post';
// ...
$response = $this->httpClient->request('POST', $webhookUrl, ...);

Same pattern as Telegram. User-overridable API URL, no SSRF filter.

4. RadioReg.php (line 30, 54)

if (empty($config['apikey']) || empty($config['webhookurl'])) { ... }
// ...
$response = $this->httpClient->post($config['webhookurl'], ...);

`webhookurl` is entirely user-controlled. No SSRF filter applied.

Trust boundary

All four connectors are accessible to any user with the station-scoped `StationPermissions::WebHooks` permission -- the same low-privilege role identified in GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4. The test webhook endpoint (`PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test`) allows immediate dispatch without waiting for a real event.

Attack chain
  1. Attacker has `WebHooks` permission for any station.
  2. Attacker creates a Mastodon-type webhook with `instance_url` set to `http://169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata) or `http://172.17.0.1:3306` (Docker internal MySQL).
  3. `Urls::parseUserUrl()` validates syntax only. `UserUrlFilter::filterSensitiveUserUrl()` is never called.
  4. Attacker triggers test dispatch via `PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test`.
  5. The server sends `POST http://169.254.169.254/api/v1/statuses` with the NowPlaying JSON body.
  6. Response is logged via `logHttpResponse()`.

The same attack works with Telegram (set `api` to internal URL), GroupMe (set `api` to internal URL), and RadioReg (set `webhookurl` to internal URL).

Impact

A station-level user with only the `WebHooks` permission can make the AzuraCast server issue outbound HTTP requests to loopback, private-network, and cloud-metadata endpoints, bypassing the SSRF guard that was specifically introduced to prevent this. This is a direct incomplete fix of GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4.

Remediation

Apply `UserUrlFilter::filterSensitiveUserUrl()` to ALL webhook connectors that accept user-configurable URLs, not just Generic/Discord/MatomoAnalytics. The Mastodon `instance_url`, Telegram `api`, GroupMe `api`, and RadioReg `webhookurl` fields should all pass through the filter before being used in HTTP requests.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracast≤ 0.23.8
0.23.8
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-qh22-76gf-qwc4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.