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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · sevenz-rust2

GHSA-QH76-45CR-8XRC

sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted .7z to write files outside the destination (Zip-Slip)

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión0.21.1
Exposición23 hDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 6:33 p. m.
Detección15 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
06:33 p. m.
05:26 p. m.
06:33 p. m.
12:16 a. m.
05:59 a. m.
11:43 a. m.
05:26 p. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QH76-45CR-8XRC divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named `../../etc/cron.d/x` or an absolute path escapes the target.

Details

In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):

let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &dest_path)

`default_entry_extract_fn` (line 154) then acts on that path:

let file = File::create(path)
    .map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;

There is no normalization, no `dest_path.starts_with(dest)` check, and no symlink-entry handling. `Path::join` discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and `..` components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (`decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, `decompress_file_with_password`) all route through `decompress_impl` with `default_entry_extract_fn`, so the default API is affected.

The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted `.7z` reaches the sink.

PoC
  1. Build a `.7z` whose `FilesInfo` contains an entry named `../../../../tmp/pwned` (or, on Windows, an absolute path such as `C:\Windows\Temp\pwned`).
  2. Call `sevenz_rust2::decompress_file("evil.7z", "./out")`.
  3. The file is created at the traversed location outside `./out`. Targeting a startup/cron path or a config file turns the write into code execution or persistence.
Impact

Arbitrary file write outside the intended directory (CWE-22 / CWE-23, the Zip-Slip class). On extraction of an attacker-controlled archive, an entry overwrites files outside the destination — config, cron, autostart, or build artifacts — which can escalate to code execution. Reachable by upload-handling backends, malware-analysis sandboxes, mod/game installers, and CI steps that unpack user-supplied 7z files.

Suggested remediation

Reject any entry whose name contains a `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` component, or canonicalize the joined path and verify `starts_with(dest)` before creating it. Apply the guard inside `default_entry_extract_fn` (and `decompress_impl`) so the hardening is the default rather than left to each caller. Reject or explicitly opt-in symlink entries.

Maintainer response

This issue was patched with ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb and released as `v0.21.1` to crates.io

Consumers that extract attacker-supplied archives received over a network without user interaction should re-score as AV:N/UI:N (≈8.6).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
sevenz-rust2< 0.21.1
0.21.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosevenz-rust2
Corregida 0.21.1 — —
Versiones corregidas0.21.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61725
Otrahttps://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2/security/advisories/GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc
Otrahttps://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2/commit/ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb
Otrahttps://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2

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