GHSA-QPXQ-MR8M-WCF2
OTP secure-session step-up missing on system/restart, core-upgrade websocket, and upstream socket PUT (follow-up to GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QPXQ-MR8M-WCF2 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Note on a duplicate report
I opened an earlier report on this same issue a short time ago under a secondary account (`apskedenap`) that I use for throwaway testing. Please disregard that one and treat this submission as the canonical one for credit purposes.
Summary
GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5 fixed a missing `middleware.RequireSecureSession()` wrapper on the `api/cluster` router and explicitly listed three other routes as unverified: "secondary lower-confidence items worth checking in the same pass... I did not fully trace these": the `system/restart` handler, the core-upgrade websocket, and the upstream socket PUT endpoint.
All three are still missing the secure-session step-up at the current HEAD (`db15caf4c9b339f677eabaa918b8cc9e37380f74`, 2026-10-10). No commit has touched either file since the GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5 publish date (2026-10-09).
Details
1. `system/restart`
`api/system/router.go`, `InitPrivateRouter`:
// Restarting takes the whole demo container down with it.
r.Any("system/restart", middleware.RejectInDemo(), Restart)Only `RejectInDemo()` guards this route (it just blocks the public demo deployment). There is no `RequireSecureSession()`. An authenticated user holding only a JWT, without a fresh secure session, can restart the whole nginx-ui service.
2. Core-upgrade websocket
Same file, `InitWebSocketRouter`:
r.GET("upgrade/perform", middleware.RejectInDemo(), PerformCoreUpgrade)Same gap: `PerformCoreUpgrade` runs the binary self-upgrade with only `RejectInDemo()`, no secure-session requirement.
3. `PUT /upstream/socket/:socket`
`api/upstream/router.go`, `InitHTTPRouter`:
func InitHTTPRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
r.GET("/upstream/availability", GetAvailability)
r.GET("/upstream/sockets", GetSocketList)
r.GET("/upstream/health_check/status", GetHealthCheckStatus)
r.PUT("/upstream/socket/:socket", UpdateSocketConfig)
// Standalone upstream groups managed by Nginx UI.
r.GET("/upstreams", ListManagedUpstreams)
r.GET("/upstreams/:name", GetManagedUpstream)
r.POST("/upstream/preview", PreviewManagedUpstream)
o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())
{
o.POST("/upstreams", CreateManagedUpstream)
o.POST("/upstreams/:name", UpdateManagedUpstream)
o.DELETE("/upstreams/:name", DeleteManagedUpstream)
o.POST("/upstream/server_state", SetUpstreamServerState)
o.POST("/upstream/convert", ConvertSiteUpstream)
}
}`UpdateSocketConfig` is registered directly on the bare `r` group, before and outside the `RequireSecureSession()` subgroup that its five sibling mutation endpoints in the same file sit inside. It mutates upstream socket configuration with only a JWT.
Attacker model and impact
Same attacker as the parent advisory: an authenticated, OTP-enabled user whose JWT is stolen or persisted but who does not hold a fresh secure session. That is exactly the actor the step-up exists to stop. All three routes let that actor reach a mutation class the project's own security model already treats as step-up-worthy on the sibling routes living in the same files (`nginx/reload`, `nginx/restart`, and the other five upstream mutation endpoints).
Verification
Source-verified at the HEAD commit above by reading the current router files directly. I did not stand up a live nginx-ui instance.
Fix
Tested by cloning the repository and applying the following patch; `git diff` shown below (I did not run the full test suite, only reviewed the diff for correctness against the existing pattern used by the sibling routes):
diff --git a/api/system/router.go b/api/system/router.go
index 974a62e..6f43fa6 100644
--- a/api/system/router.go
+++ b/api/system/router.go
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func InitPrivateRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
r.Any("system/stats", GetProcessStats)
// Restarting takes the whole demo container down with it.
- r.Any("system/restart", middleware.RejectInDemo(), Restart)
+ r.Any("system/restart", middleware.RejectInDemo(), middleware.RequireSecureSession(), Restart)
g := r.Group("self_check")
g.GET("", SelfCheck)
@@ -44,6 +44,6 @@ func InitWebSocketRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
// internal/upgrader/binary.go already turns the install step into a no-op in
// demo mode, but the archive is still downloaded and verified first. Refuse
// before any of that runs.
- r.GET("upgrade/perform", middleware.RejectInDemo(), PerformCoreUpgrade)
+ r.GET("upgrade/perform", middleware.RejectInDemo(), middleware.RequireSecureSession(), PerformCoreUpgrade)
r.GET("self_check/websocket", CheckWebSocket)
}
diff --git a/api/upstream/router.go b/api/upstream/router.go
index c454a4a..2948b27 100644
--- a/api/upstream/router.go
+++ b/api/upstream/router.go
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ func InitHTTPRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
r.GET("/upstream/availability", GetAvailability)
r.GET("/upstream/sockets", GetSocketList)
r.GET("/upstream/health_check/status", GetHealthCheckStatus)
- r.PUT("/upstream/socket/:socket", UpdateSocketConfig)
// Standalone upstream groups managed by Nginx UI.
r.GET("/upstreams", ListManagedUpstreams)
@@ -18,6 +17,7 @@ func InitHTTPRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())
{
+ o.PUT("/upstream/socket/:socket", UpdateSocketConfig)
o.POST("/upstreams", CreateManagedUpstream)
o.POST("/upstreams/:name", UpdateManagedUpstream)
o.DELETE("/upstreams/:name", DeleteManagedUpstream)This mirrors the exact pattern already used for `nginx/reload`/`nginx/restart` and the other upstream mutation endpoints, so it should not require any other change (no new middleware, no new import).
---
If this is useful, credit in the published advisory would be appreciated.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 afectada |
2.9.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-qpxq-mr8m-wcf2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
