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Advisory · GitHub · npm · flowise

GHSA-QQVM-66Q4-VF5C

Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -31 d de la divulgación
Exposición217 dDesde la divulgación, 16 abr 2026, 4:23 p. m.
Detección214 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
16 mar 26
16 abr 26
13 may 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
16 mar 26
17 may 26
18 jul 26
18 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.0 flowise · -31 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QQVM-66Q4-VF5C divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (`httpSecurity.ts`) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.

However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (`node-fetch`, `axios`Instead of using the secured wrapper.

Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.

This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.

### Details
Intended Security Model:

All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:

packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts

This layer performs:

  • `HTTP_DENY_LIST` enforcement
  • IP resolution validation
  • IP pinning
  • Loopback blocking

Observed Implementation Gap:

Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.

Examples include:

  • `packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts`
  • `packages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts`
  • `packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts`
  • `packages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.ts`

These files directly execute:

importfetchfrom'node-fetch'

or invoke `axios` without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.

Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.

This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.

Root Cause

Security enforcement is not centralized.

Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.

Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.

This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.

### PoC
Even when an administrator configures:

HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8

The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:

Chat Prompt:

Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Execution flow:

  1. The LLM triggers `WebScraperTool`.
  2. The tool calls raw `fetch()` directly.
  3. No `httpSecurity.ts` validation is applied.
  4. The request reaches the metadata endpoint.
  5. The response is returned to the chat context.

This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.
### Impact

Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

This issue:

  • Completely bypasses the centralized SSRF mitigation.
  • Allows access to internal network resources.
  • Enables the exploitation of cloud metadata and credential theft.
  • Invalidates the security assumptions of the recent patch.

Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.

Recommended Remediation
  1. Refactor all tools to use the centralized `secureFetch()` wrapper.
  2. Add ESLint `no-restricted-imports` rules to prohibit the direct usage of `node-fetch` or `axios` in tool components.
  3. Consider implementing a single internal HTTP client abstraction layer.
  4. Apply network-level egress filtering as defense-in-depth.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
flowise · flowise-components< 3.1.0
3.1.0
3.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmflowise
Corregida 3.1.0 -31 d 3.1.4 no afectada
npmflowise-components
Corregida 3.1.0 -31 d 3.1.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43995
Otrahttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-qqvm-66q4-vf5c
Otrahttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise

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