GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2
Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's Flow
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.9.1 | langflow · -56 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in `src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414) https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67.
When a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:
# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414
async def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead:
async with session_scope() as session:
try:
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
# When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # ❌ No user_id check!
except ValueError:
endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name
stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)
# Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked
if user_id:
stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)This function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589` https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589).
PoC (Proof of Concept)
# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses" \
-H "x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "VICTIM_FLOW_ID",
"input_value": "test",
"stream": false
}'
# Returns 200 and executes the victim's flowImpact
Any authenticated user can:
1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID
2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows
3. Consume victim's resources
Fixes
Fixed in PR #12832 (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in Langflow 1.9.1.
The helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on both lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`):
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)
if flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:
flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404Key points:
- Cross-user lookups return 404 (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.
- `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).
- A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).
- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).
- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:
* @yzeirnials
* @johnatzeropath
* @LeftenantZero
* @Zwique
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypilangflow |
Corregida | 1.9.1 | -56 d | 1.13.2 no afectada |
1.9.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12832https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/2c9f498d664a3c32698b57d7c5e752625291060ehttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflowhttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-221.yamlhttps://webflow.sysdig.com/blog/understanding-langflow-cve-2026-55255-and-why-higher-cvss-vulnerabilities-arent-always-the-most-exploitedhttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-55255Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
