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GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2

Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's Flow

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -56 d de la divulgación
Exposición153 dDesde la divulgación, 19 jun 2026, 4:16 p. m.
Detección150 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.9.1
Monitoreo
Detectada
24 abr 26
19 jun 26
7 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
24 abr 26
16 jun 26
7 ago 26
28 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.9.1 langflow · -56 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in `src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414) https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67.

When a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:

# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414
async def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead:
    async with session_scope() as session:
        try:
            flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
            # When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id
            flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)  # ❌ No user_id check!
        except ValueError:
            endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name
            stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)
            # Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked
            if user_id:
                stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)

This function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589` https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589).

PoC (Proof of Concept)

# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses" \
  -H "x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "model": "VICTIM_FLOW_ID",
    "input_value": "test",
    "stream": false
  }'
# Returns 200 and executes the victim's flow

Impact

Any authenticated user can:
1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID
2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows
3. Consume victim's resources

Fixes

Fixed in PR #12832 (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in Langflow 1.9.1.

The helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on both lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`):

flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)
if flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:
    flow = None  # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404

Key points:
- Cross-user lookups return 404 (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.
- `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).
- A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).
- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).
- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:
* @yzeirnials
* @johnatzeropath
* @LeftenantZero
* @Zwique

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
langflow< 1.9.1
1.9.1
1.13.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypilangflow
Corregida 1.9.1 -56 d 1.13.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.9.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12832
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/2c9f498d664a3c32698b57d7c5e752625291060e
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow
Otrahttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-221.yaml
Otrahttps://webflow.sysdig.com/blog/understanding-langflow-cve-2026-55255-and-why-higher-cvss-vulnerabilities-arent-always-the-most-exploited
Otrahttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-55255

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