GHSA-QVGV-5MRH-H8WJ
Existing EMAIL message UUID allows cross-user message-history modification
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QVGV-5MRH-H8WJ divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An authenticated Admidio user can submit an otherwise permitted email while supplying the UUID of another user’s existing EMAIL history entry.
The send handler loads the referenced message and adds the attacker’s body without checking whether the current user owns or may modify that message. In Admidio 4.1.0 through 5.0.8, successful delivery persists the added body under the foreign message and replaces the parent message’s sender ID with the attacker’s user ID.
The attacker must use their own valid session and form token, must already be allowed to contact the selected recipient, and must cause email delivery to succeed. The attacker must also obtain a valid foreign EMAIL message UUID separately.
No UUID disclosure method or practical UUID-guessing attack was established.
Details
Admidio stores email history in a parent message row and stores message bodies in dependent content rows. The message UUID selects the parent history entry.
In Admidio 5.0.6, modules/messages/messages_send.php accepts msg_uuid, loads the corresponding message, and replaces the requested message type with the stored type:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.6/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L29-L60
Before the EMAIL and PM branches separate, the handler replaces the parent sender ID with the current user and queues the submitted body:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.6/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L81-L87
The PM branch checks whether the current user is the message sender or conversation partner:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.6/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L285-L295
The EMAIL branch has no equivalent ownership or participation check.
The existing recipient checks remain active. They decide whether the current user may contact the selected users or roles, but they do not authorize modification of the existing message selected through msg_uuid.
After email delivery succeeds, the handler calls Message::save():
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.6/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L277-L321
In Admidio 5.0.6, changing msg_usr_id_sender causes the parent message to be updated. Message::save() then stores the queued content row under that parent’s message ID:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.6/src/Messages/Entity/Message.php#L547-L574
The source-level effects are therefore:
The parent sender ID is replaced with the attacker’s user ID.
The attacker’s body is stored under the foreign message ID.
The UUID-based entry point is present in Admidio 4.1.0:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v4.1.0/adm_program/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L20-L75
That release also replaces the sender, adds the submitted content, and saves the message following successful delivery:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v4.1.0/adm_program/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L140-L144
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v4.1.0/adm_program/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L474-L479
The same behavior remains in Admidio 5.0.8:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.8/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L56-L92
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.8/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L328-L332
Admidio 5.0.9 moved sender and subject initialization into the new-message branch. An existing message is no longer assigned a new sender:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/messages/messages_send.php#L79-L90
In releases 5.0.9 through 5.0.18, dependent content is saved only when the parent message is saved. Because the foreign EMAIL path no longer changes the parent row, the queued content is not persisted:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/Messages/Entity/Message.php#L547-L574
These releases should not be included in the affected range.
The development snapshot at commit e66553d67281a0feddccd13496ebf474e299c547 is affected again. MessageService loads any supplied message UUID, adopts its stored type, and adds the submitted body without checking EMAIL ownership:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/e66553d67281a0feddccd13496ebf474e299c547/src/Messages/Service/MessageService.php#L72-L87
The same service applies an ownership or participation check to PM messages:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/e66553d67281a0feddccd13496ebf474e299c547/src/Messages/Service/MessageService.php#L284-L294
The development Message::save() implementation permits dependent content to be saved when the existing parent row does not require an update:
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/e66553d67281a0feddccd13496ebf474e299c547/src/Messages/Entity/Message.php#L553-L598
In that development snapshot, the parent sender remains unchanged, but the attacker’s content can still be associated with the foreign message.
The affected released range for this exact UUID-based behavior is 4.1.0 through 5.0.8. Releases 5.0.9 through 5.0.18 do not persist the modification. The development snapshot is not a released package version and should not be entered in the affected-product field.
Proof of concept
No end-to-end HTTP, database, or SMTP reproduction was performed.
Use a disposable Admidio installation, a disposable SMTP sink, and a restorable database.
Create separate alice and mallory accounts.
Sign in as Alice and send an email so that the database contains an EMAIL message owned by Alice.
Obtain Alice’s message UUID directly from the disposable database. This avoids assuming that another endpoint discloses message UUIDs.
Sign in as Mallory and open the ordinary email compose form to obtain Mallory’s valid session-bound form token.
Select a recipient Mallory is already permitted to contact and complete all fields required by the rendered form.
Submit the form to the send endpoint while adding Alice’s message UUID:
POST /modules/messages/messages_send.php?msg_type=EMAIL&msg_uuid=ALICE_EMAIL_MESSAGE_UUID HTTP/1.1
Cookie: MALLORY_SESSION
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
adm_csrf_token=MALLORY_FORM_TOKEN&OTHER_REQUIRED_FORM_FIELDS
For Admidio 5.0.6, the source-derived expected result after successful email delivery is:
Alice’s parent message sender ID changes to Mallory’s user ID.
A new content row containing Mallory’s submitted body is stored under Alice’s message ID.
For the development snapshot at e66553d67281a0feddccd13496ebf474e299c547, the source-derived expected result is:
Alice remains the parent message sender.
A new content row containing Mallory’s submitted body is stored under Alice’s message ID.
These are expected results derived from source review. They were not observed in a deployed installation.
The same request without msg_uuid is the ordinary positive control and should create Mallory’s own message-history entry.
A fixed build should reject a request containing another user’s EMAIL UUID before sending mail or changing any parent message, content, recipient, or attachment row.
Restore the disposable database after testing.
Impact
The demonstrated impact is an unauthorized stored integrity change to another user’s email history.
In Admidio 4.1.0 through 5.0.8, an authenticated sender who obtains a foreign EMAIL message UUID can add attacker-controlled content to that history entry and replace its parent sender ID.
In the inspected development snapshot, the parent sender remains unchanged, but attacker-controlled content can still be stored under the foreign message.
The attack does not bypass recipient authorization. The attacker must already be permitted to contact the selected recipient and email delivery must succeed.
This report does not establish disclosure of message content, arbitrary-recipient delivery, account takeover, UUID disclosure, practical UUID brute force, or code execution.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistadmidio/admidio |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-qvgv-5mrh-h8wjLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
