GHSA-QWH6-X463-CCF4
Broken access control in GET /api/station/{id}/vue/profile allows Station View users to read Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QWH6-X463-CCF4 divulgada · CVSS 7.6 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Broken access control in `GET /api/station/{station_id}/vue/profile` allows Station View users to read Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords
A station user with only View Station Page can call `GET /api/station/{station_id}/vue/profile` and receive the station’s Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords in the JSON response.
Those credentials are treated as Broadcasting-sensitive in the Vue UI (`FrontendPanel.vue` gates display on `StationPermissions.Broadcasting`). The API route does not: the `/vue` group requires only `StationPermissions::View`, and `ProfileAction` always serializes the three password fields.
This is authenticated station-scoped privilege escalation / sensitive info disclosure — not unauthenticated, and not “admin can admin.” Confirmed end-to-end: a View-only session receives the passwords; the leaked `admin_pw` authenticates to Icecast admin (`/admin/stats` → HTTP 200).
Affected
- Product: AzuraCast
- Tested: commit `3f9d6ff626745d9aa20a7158eec7a8583ed635e0` (rolling), Docker
- Components:
- `backend/config/routes/api_station_vue.php` (`GET /vue/profile` under View-only group)
- `backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Vue/ProfileAction.php` (unconditional password fields)
- Contrast (correct UI gate): `frontend/components/Stations/Profile/FrontendPanel.vue`
Prerequisites
- Authenticated account (session cookie or API key) with StationPermissions::View on a station
- Without Broadcasting (or equivalent) on that station
- Station frontend configured (Icecast/Shoutcast passwords present in `frontend_config`)
Impact
On multi-user / multi-role installs, a View-only staff account, guest observer, or View-scoped API key can obtain live broadcast frontend secrets that the product’s own UI treats as Broadcasting-only. With the leaked Icecast `admin_pw`, the attacker authenticates to the Icecast admin interface (listener/stats/admin actions such as kicking clients) without holding Broadcasting in AzuraCast.
Single-admin installs are lower practical risk; the API still violates the permission model.
Attack path
- Attacker holds station View only (no Broadcasting).
- Attacker requests `GET /api/station/{id}/vue/profile` (browser session + CSRF, or API key).
- Response includes `frontendAdminPassword`, `frontendSourcePassword`, `frontendRelayPassword`.
- Attacker uses `admin_pw` against Icecast admin (e.g. `/admin/stats`).
Steps to reproduce
Environment: AzuraCast Docker, web on `http://127.0.0.1`, Icecast on port `8000`, commit `3f9d6ff`.
- As Super Admin, create a role with only “View Station Page” for the target station. Create a user with that role (no Broadcasting, no Profile, no global admin).
- Log in as that View-only user in a browser (e.g. through Burp). Open the station management / Profile page so the Vue client loads profile props.
- In Burp HTTP history (or Repeater), inspect:
GET /api/station/1/vue/profile HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Cookie: app_session=<view-only-session>
X-API-CSRF: <csrf-from-dashboard>
Accept: application/jsonNo `X-API-Key` required when using a normal login session.
- Observe HTTP 200 with plaintext fields (values redacted here):
{
"frontendAdminPassword": "<admin_pw>",
"frontendSourcePassword": "<source_pw>",
"frontendRelayPassword": "<relay_pw>",
"frontendPort": 8000,
"frontendAdminUri": "http://localhost/listen/<station>/admin.html"
}- Confirm the same View-only principal is denied Broadcasting surfaces:
| Request | Result |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/station/1/mounts` | 403 |
| `GET /api/station/1/remotes` | 403 |
| `GET /api/station/1/streamers` | 403 |
| `PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit` | 403 |
- Confirm UI contrast: as the same user, the Profile Broadcasting credentials panel is not rendered (`FrontendPanel.vue` `v-if` on Broadcasting). Secrets are still present in the API response from step 4.
- Impact check : authenticate to Icecast with the leaked admin password:
curl -u "admin:<frontendAdminPassword>" http://127.0.0.1:8000/admin/stats
# → HTTP 200, XML <icestats>...</icestats>Wrong credentials → HTTP 401 / empty body.
Expected: Password fields omitted (or request denied) unless the caller has Broadcasting.
Actual: View is enough; passwords always returned.
Root cause
Route group applies only View; `/profile` adds no Broadcasting middleware (unlike `/files` / `/podcasts`):
// backend/config/routes/api_station_vue.php
$group->get('/profile', Controller\Api\Stations\Vue\ProfileAction::class)
->setName('api:vue:stations:profile:index');
// ...
})->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::View, true));Controller always returns frontend passwords:
// backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Vue/ProfileAction.php
frontendAdminPassword: $frontendConfig->admin_pw,
frontendSourcePassword: $frontendConfig->source_pw,
frontendRelayPassword: $frontendConfig->relay_pw,UI-only gate (does not protect the API):
<!-- frontend/components/Stations/Profile/FrontendPanel.vue -->
<template v-if="userAllowedForStation(StationPermissions.Broadcasting)">Suggested fix
- Preferred: In `ProfileAction` (or a response mapper), omit `frontendAdminPassword`, `frontendSourcePassword`, and `frontendRelayPassword` unless the ACL grants `StationPermissions::Broadcasting`.
- Do not rely on the Vue `v-if` alone for secrets; keep it as defense-in-depth.
- Avoid gating the entire `/vue/profile` response on Broadcasting if View still needs non-secret profile fields strip secrets server-side instead.
### Screenshots
<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76c8eeed-f83a-499e-bf84-089a054af16f" />
Desglose de métricas
Estado del parche por paquete
La fuente no informa paquetes ni versiones corregidas.
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-qwh6-x463-ccf4Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
