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Advisory · GitHub

GHSA-QWH6-X463-CCF4

Broken access control in GET /api/station/{id}/vue/profile allows Station View users to read Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords

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CVSS 3.1
7.6
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición103 dDesde la divulgación, 7 ago 2026, 4:17 p. m.
Detección102 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 ago 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
7 ago 26
2 sept 26
28 sept 26
24 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-QWH6-X463-CCF4 divulgada · CVSS 7.6 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Broken access control in `GET /api/station/{station_id}/vue/profile` allows Station View users to read Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords

A station user with only View Station Page can call `GET /api/station/{station_id}/vue/profile` and receive the station’s Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, and relay passwords in the JSON response.

Those credentials are treated as Broadcasting-sensitive in the Vue UI (`FrontendPanel.vue` gates display on `StationPermissions.Broadcasting`). The API route does not: the `/vue` group requires only `StationPermissions::View`, and `ProfileAction` always serializes the three password fields.

This is authenticated station-scoped privilege escalation / sensitive info disclosure — not unauthenticated, and not “admin can admin.” Confirmed end-to-end: a View-only session receives the passwords; the leaked `admin_pw` authenticates to Icecast admin (`/admin/stats` → HTTP 200).

Affected

  • Product: AzuraCast
  • Tested: commit `3f9d6ff626745d9aa20a7158eec7a8583ed635e0` (rolling), Docker
  • Components:
  • `backend/config/routes/api_station_vue.php` (`GET /vue/profile` under View-only group)
  • `backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Vue/ProfileAction.php` (unconditional password fields)
  • Contrast (correct UI gate): `frontend/components/Stations/Profile/FrontendPanel.vue`

Prerequisites

  • Authenticated account (session cookie or API key) with StationPermissions::View on a station
  • Without Broadcasting (or equivalent) on that station
  • Station frontend configured (Icecast/Shoutcast passwords present in `frontend_config`)

Impact

On multi-user / multi-role installs, a View-only staff account, guest observer, or View-scoped API key can obtain live broadcast frontend secrets that the product’s own UI treats as Broadcasting-only. With the leaked Icecast `admin_pw`, the attacker authenticates to the Icecast admin interface (listener/stats/admin actions such as kicking clients) without holding Broadcasting in AzuraCast.

Single-admin installs are lower practical risk; the API still violates the permission model.

Attack path

  1. Attacker holds station View only (no Broadcasting).
  2. Attacker requests `GET /api/station/{id}/vue/profile` (browser session + CSRF, or API key).
  3. Response includes `frontendAdminPassword`, `frontendSourcePassword`, `frontendRelayPassword`.
  4. Attacker uses `admin_pw` against Icecast admin (e.g. `/admin/stats`).

Steps to reproduce

Environment: AzuraCast Docker, web on `http://127.0.0.1`, Icecast on port `8000`, commit `3f9d6ff`.

  1. As Super Admin, create a role with only “View Station Page” for the target station. Create a user with that role (no Broadcasting, no Profile, no global admin).
  1. Log in as that View-only user in a browser (e.g. through Burp). Open the station management / Profile page so the Vue client loads profile props.
  1. In Burp HTTP history (or Repeater), inspect:
GET /api/station/1/vue/profile HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Cookie: app_session=<view-only-session>
X-API-CSRF: <csrf-from-dashboard>
Accept: application/json

No `X-API-Key` required when using a normal login session.

  1. Observe HTTP 200 with plaintext fields (values redacted here):
{
  "frontendAdminPassword": "<admin_pw>",
  "frontendSourcePassword": "<source_pw>",
  "frontendRelayPassword": "<relay_pw>",
  "frontendPort": 8000,
  "frontendAdminUri": "http://localhost/listen/<station>/admin.html"
}
  1. Confirm the same View-only principal is denied Broadcasting surfaces:

| Request | Result |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/station/1/mounts` | 403 |
| `GET /api/station/1/remotes` | 403 |
| `GET /api/station/1/streamers` | 403 |
| `PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit` | 403 |

  1. Confirm UI contrast: as the same user, the Profile Broadcasting credentials panel is not rendered (`FrontendPanel.vue` `v-if` on Broadcasting). Secrets are still present in the API response from step 4.
  1. Impact check : authenticate to Icecast with the leaked admin password:
curl -u "admin:<frontendAdminPassword>" http://127.0.0.1:8000/admin/stats
# → HTTP 200, XML <icestats>...</icestats>

Wrong credentials → HTTP 401 / empty body.

Expected: Password fields omitted (or request denied) unless the caller has Broadcasting.
Actual: View is enough; passwords always returned.

Root cause

Route group applies only View; `/profile` adds no Broadcasting middleware (unlike `/files` / `/podcasts`):

// backend/config/routes/api_station_vue.php
$group->get('/profile', Controller\Api\Stations\Vue\ProfileAction::class)
    ->setName('api:vue:stations:profile:index');
// ...
})->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::View, true));

Controller always returns frontend passwords:

// backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Vue/ProfileAction.php
frontendAdminPassword: $frontendConfig->admin_pw,
frontendSourcePassword: $frontendConfig->source_pw,
frontendRelayPassword: $frontendConfig->relay_pw,

UI-only gate (does not protect the API):

<!-- frontend/components/Stations/Profile/FrontendPanel.vue -->
<template v-if="userAllowedForStation(StationPermissions.Broadcasting)">

Suggested fix

  1. Preferred: In `ProfileAction` (or a response mapper), omit `frontendAdminPassword`, `frontendSourcePassword`, and `frontendRelayPassword` unless the ACL grants `StationPermissions::Broadcasting`.
  2. Do not rely on the Vue `v-if` alone for secrets; keep it as defense-in-depth.
  3. Avoid gating the entire `/vue/profile` response on Broadcasting if View still needs non-secret profile fields strip secrets server-side instead.

### Screenshots
<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76c8eeed-f83a-499e-bf84-089a054af16f" />

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

La fuente no informa paquetes ni versiones corregidas.

Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-qwh6-x463-ccf4

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