llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-R23W-HV44-7PJQ

Station Profile user without Broadcasting can read and reset Icecast passwords via profile/edit

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición14 dDesde la divulgación, 5 nov 2026, 4:05 p. m.
Detección12 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
5 nov 26
9 nov 26
13 nov 26
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-R23W-HV44-7PJQ divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

A station user who holds "Manage Station Profile" but not "Manage Station Broadcasting" can read the station's Icecast/Shoutcast admin, source, relay and streamer passwords, and can overwrite them, through `GET` and `PUT /api/station/{station_id}/profile/edit`.

AzuraCast already treats these passwords as Broadcasting-only. The fix for GHSA-qwh6-x463-ccf4 / GHSA-6mwx-gw6f-5f36 made `GET /api/station/{id}/vue/profile` return `frontendAdminPassword`, `frontendSourcePassword` and `frontendRelayPassword` only when the caller has Broadcasting, and the Vue UI gates them the same way. The neighbouring profile/edit endpoint still hands out and accepts the same values.

Root cause:
- The `/profile/edit` route group requires only `StationPermissions::Profile` (`backend/config/routes/api_station.php`).
- `ProfileEditController::getProfileAction()` serializes the station with `GROUP_ID` + `GROUP_GENERAL`. `Station::$frontend_config` is in `GROUP_GENERAL`, and `StationFrontendConfiguration` is serialized through `AbstractArrayEntity::toArray()`, which emits every public property, including `admin_pw`, `source_pw`, `relay_pw` and `streamer_pw`.
- `putProfileAction()` strips only the Liquidsoap custom sections (GHSA-q8wg-3qg7-8pc7 / GHSA-53mh-vf3g-pggg) and, since the GHSA-2wcv-vv3g-g86q fix, `frontend_config.custom_config`. The password fields themselves pass straight through to `editRecord()`.

This is a different field set from GHSA-2wcv-vv3g-g86q (that report was about injecting directives through `custom_config`, which is now stripped) and a different endpoint from GHSA-qwh6-x463-ccf4 (`vue/profile`).

Verification (live, on a disposable lab VM running the official `ghcr.io/azuracast/azuracast:latest` image, revision a683c9d). Admin created Station A (id 1, Icecast) and a role "Profile Editor" with only "View Station Page" + "Manage Station Profile" on Station A. User mallory has that role and her own API key.

Controls (as mallory, API key):
- `GET /api/station/1/vue/profile` -> 200 with `"frontendAdminPassword":""`, `"frontendSourcePassword":""`, `"frontendRelayPassword":""` (the existing fix works).
- `GET /api/station/1/liquidsoap-config` -> 403, `GET /api/station/1/mounts` -> 403, `GET /api/admin/station/1` -> 403.
- `PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit` with `{"frontend_config":{"custom_config":"<x>1</x>"}}` -> 200, but `custom_config` stays null (the GHSA-2wcv fix works).

Attack (as mallory):
- `GET /api/station/1/profile/edit` -> 200, `frontend_config` contains `admin_pw`, `source_pw`, `relay_pw` and `streamer_pw` in clear, matching the values the admin sees.
- The leaked `admin_pw` works against Icecast: `GET /admin/stats` on the station's Icecast port with `admin:<leaked admin_pw>` -> 200 (wrong password -> 401).
- `PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit` with `{"frontend_config":{"admin_pw":"MalloryOwns1","source_pw":"MallorySrc1"}}` -> 200 "Record updated successfully."; the admin view now shows the new values. After the next station restart, Icecast `/admin/stats` returns 401 for the original admin password and 200 for mallory's.

Impact: on multi-user installs where Profile is delegated without Broadcasting, that user gets the Icecast admin password (listener kicks, mount moves, metadata) and the source password (connect as a source and broadcast to listeners), and can reset these passwords to lock the real operators out of Icecast. These are exactly the secrets the project has decided need Broadcasting.

Suggested fix: in `ProfileEditController`, when the caller lacks Broadcasting, drop `admin_pw`, `source_pw`, `relay_pw`, `streamer_pw` (and probably `port` / `max_listeners`, which the Vue view also gates) from the GET output and unset them from the PUT body, in the same place `custom_config` is already unset.

Credit: kats1123 (Jona Kats).

This report was prepared with AI assistance and verified by hand on a lab instance (the control and attack requests above were run end to end).

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracast≤ 0.24.0
0.24.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-r23w-hv44-7pjq

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.