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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-R6R4-5MR3-RPPM

Read-only user can delete attachments in readable folders

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CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.3.3
Exposición26 dDesde la divulgación, 26 oct 2026, 1:03 a. m.
Detección24 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Las PoC crecen rápido, como las llamas bebé.Seguimiento de cerca: yo sé de mirar de cerca.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
26 oct 26
1 nov 26
8 nov 26
15 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-R6R4-5MR3-RPPM divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

TeamPass did not check the right a user holds on an item before changing its attachments:

  • A user who can only read a shared folder can permanently delete the attachments of its items.
  • Any user able to create an item can **move the attachments of any other item onto their own and
  • A user can also get a file of their choice published as an attachment of an item they cannot edit.
Details

Attachments are written to the `files` table as soon as they are uploaded, unconfirmed, under the
item they target. They are attached once the item is saved. Three server-side handlers trusted the
request:

  1. Deleting an attachment
  2. `delete_attached_file` (`app/sources/items.queries.php`) only checked that the item's folder
  3. That list holds every folder the user can see:
  4. read-only folders;
  5. folders without the edit right (`NE`, `NDNE`);
  6. for an administrator, every shared folder.
  7. Read-only accounts and item restrictions (`restricted_to`, role restrictions) were not checked
  8. The handler deletes the database row, the sharekeys and the encrypted file on disk.
  9. Attaching files to a new item
  10. The attachments of an item being created are uploaded first, under a temporary id generated by
  11. On save, `new_item` moved to the new item every `files` row whose item id equalled that value,
  12. Sending the id of an existing item as the temporary id therefore moved all of that item's
  13. Attachment keys of items outside personal folders are shared with every user, whatever their
  14. Uploading an attachment
  15. `upload.attachments.php` only checked the edit right when the upload declared an existing item
  16. `confirm_attachments` then confirmed every unconfirmed file of the item the next time an editor
  17. Opening an item discards its unconfirmed files, so the file has to be uploaded while an editor
  18. Before 3.2.0.0, the upload checked no right at all.
Proof of concept

The session key is the one the items page embeds in its own scripts. Requests go to
`sources/items.queries.php`, with `data` encrypted by the page's `prepareExchangedData()`.

Deletion.
1. An administrator gives user B read-only access to a shared folder holding an item with an
attachment.
2. B opens the item and reads the attachment id returned by `show_details_item`. File ids are
sequential, so they can also be enumerated.
3. B posts `type=delete_attached_file` with `{"file_id": <id>}`.
4. The attachment is gone for everyone.

Read.
1. User C has no access to the folder of item V, which holds attachments. C has a personal folder.
2. C creates an item in their personal folder, and sets `uploaded_file_id` to the id of V in the
`new_item` request. Item ids are sequential, and the id of C's previous item gives the current
upper bound.
3. V's attachments are now listed on C's new item. C downloads them in clear, and V no longer has
them.

Impact
  • Deletion. Who can do it: any user with read-only, `NE` or `NDNE` access to a folder, a
  • Read. Who can do it: any user who is not read-only and can create an item, their own personal
  • items in folders they cannot access;
  • items restricted to other users or roles.

The attachments are removed from their item at the same time. Attachments of other users'
personal items cannot be decrypted this way, because their key is only shared with their owner,
but they are still taken from the owner's item.
- Replacement. Any user can make a file of their choice appear as an attachment of an item they
cannot edit, if an editor saves that item while the upload happens.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.3.3:
- Deleting an attachment requires the edit right on its item. That check also covers item
restrictions, read-only accounts and administrators.
- Each upload is recorded in the session that made it. Only those files are attached to a new item
or confirmed when an item is saved.
- An upload to an existing item requires the edit right on it.
- The temporary id of a new item may not designate an existing item.

Workarounds

No setting disables attachments. Until the upgrade:

  • Review the attachment deletions. TeamPass logs them under the user who made them (default table

```sql
SELECT l.date, l.id_item, l.id_user, l.raison
FROM teampass_log_items AS l
WHERE l.action = 'at_modification' AND l.raison LIKE 'at_del_file : %';
```

  • Look for attachments that left the item they were uploaded on. An attachment never changes item

```sql
SELECT f.id AS file_id, l.id_item AS uploaded_on_item, f.id_item AS now_on_item, l.id_user AS uploaded_by
FROM teampass_files AS f
JOIN teampass_log_items AS l
ON l.action = 'at_modification'
AND l.raison LIKE CONCAT('at_add_file : %:', f.id)
WHERE l.id_item <> f.id_item;
```

Attachments uploaded while their item was being created are not logged with `at_add_file`. This
query cannot see them if they were moved.

References
  • Release notes: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/releases/tag/3.2.3.3

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.0.0.0 < 3.2.3.3
3.0.0.0
3.2.3.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.3.3 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.3.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-r6r4-5mr3-rppm

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.