GHSA-R6W9-259G-GWRV
Vikunja: Plaintext storage of password-reset/email-confirm tokens in database enables account takeover on DB read access
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-R6W9-259G-GWRV divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
Vikunja stores password-reset, email-confirmation, and account-deletion tokens in the `user_tokens` table in plaintext. If an attacker gains read access to the database through a backup leak, misconfigured storage, or SQL-level exposure, they can immediately use pending tokens to take over user accounts without knowing passwords.
Details
`pkg/user/token.go` — `genToken()` stores the raw random string directly:
func genToken(u *User, kind TokenKind) (*Token, error) {
tokenStr, err := utils.CryptoRandomString(tokenSize)
...
return &Token{
UserID: u.ID,
Kind: kind,
Token: tokenStr, // stored as-is, no hashing
}, nil
}Lookup also uses plaintext equality:
func getToken(s *xorm.Session, token string, kind TokenKind) (t *Token, err error) {
has, err := s.Where("kind = ? AND token = ?", kind, token).Get(t)
}Affected token types:
- `TokenPasswordReset` (`pkg/user/user_password_reset.go:120`)
- `TokenEmailConfirm` (`pkg/user/user_create.go:101`, `pkg/user/update_email.go:88`)
- `TokenAccountDeletion` (`pkg/user/delete.go:102`)
Note: CalDAV tokens correctly use `generateHashedToken` with bcrypt — the same protection is absent for the above types.
PoC
-- Attacker with DB read dumps all pending password-reset tokens:
SELECT u.email, t.token FROM user_tokens t
JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id WHERE t.kind = 1;
-- Then takes over any account:
curl -X POST https://vikunja.example.com/api/v1/user/password/reset \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"token": "<plaintext_from_db>", "new_password": "AttackerPass1!"}'Impact
Any read access to the database (leaked backup, cloud misconfiguration, secondary SQLi) allows an attacker to take over every user account with a pending reset token within the 24-hour token lifetime. Full account takeover including admin accounts.
Fix
Replace `genToken` with `generateHashedToken` for `TokenPasswordReset`, `TokenEmailConfirm`, and `TokenAccountDeletion`. Update the corresponding lookup to use bcrypt comparison (`bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword`) rather than direct SQL equality, mirroring the existing CalDAV token implementation in the same file.
If possible, please apply for a CVE number when posting.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gocode.vikunja.io/api |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.24.6 afectada |
2.4.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-r6w9-259g-gwrvhttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/00fd2c6155c01faae99be4226b931d8091fd6323https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/3a0ea15d8c18ff960bc98ae39950fa7a14b0af7dhttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/e31ea2de5040fa63bc97cf4df63bafed3bd9ad85https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunjahttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
