GHSA-R7WG-F7R2-8WF7
Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-R7WG-F7R2-8WF7 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Summary
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.
### Details
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:
- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.
The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:
`
result = subprocess.run(
[path, "read", str(tmp_path)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,
)`
### PoC
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:
Clone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py.
Confirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x.
Trace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() → _http_download() → _extract_binary() → rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) → subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk().
Optionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module's own docstring, "the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x'd, and executed with no rejection.
### Impact
Type: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check),
leading to potential arbitrary code execution.
Who's affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx's release pipeline or a maintainer's release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
PyPIaxon-mcp |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76818https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/2https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/3https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/398e47d5d2b1e1ba88c8d2bac90ac30811a9152bhttps://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/c5863e616688c6c60b2716db9ce4b1b522213b8chttps://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/d2cc7bccd99c76ec06ac7f7f04d3b2f765c9e741https://github.com/sammyjdev/axonLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
