GHSA-R8GW-6HFJ-98JW
Desktop GUI stores an mTLS client private key in plaintext, world-readable SharedPreferences
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-R8GW-6HFJ-98JW divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 1.4.9 | openssl-encrypt · 1 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
The desktop GUI's Settings screen offered a 'combined certificate and private key' PEM paste field for the pepper and integrity mTLS clients, and stored the pasted value -- including the client PRIVATE KEY -- in SharedPreferences, a world-readable 0644 file, in cleartext (CWE-312). The value was also never actually used by the connection test, and separate unused client-key-PEM accessors and an import allowlist entry widened the same exposure.
Fix (1.4.9, both lines): the client cert/key PEM is written to a dedicated 0600 file and only its path is kept in SharedPreferences; the dead client-key-PEM accessors and import entries are removed; a one-time migration moves any existing plaintext PEM to the protected file and scrubs the cleartext value. Tracked as gitlab#259.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypiopenssl-encrypt |
Corregida | 1.4.9 | 1 d | 1.4.9 no afectada |
1.4.9Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-r8gw-6hfj-98jwLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
