GHSA-R9MF-88R7-G6J9
Account takeover via OIDC login: the continue redirect hands the victim's root-session token to any unverified custom domain
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-R9MF-88R7-G6J9 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Account takeover via OIDC login: the `continue` redirect hands the victim's root-session token to any (unverified) custom domain
- Component: `pkg/server/api/connect/v1/oidc_handler.go` (`buildSessionTransferURL`),
- Version: probod v0.222.2 (`a3b65a644`), default configuration.
- Class: CWE-601 (Open Redirect) + CWE-522/CWE-384 (session credential exposed in URL to an
- Severity (proposed): High — CVSS 3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` ≈ 8.3.
- Confidence: High — every link verified in source; token-transfer PoC passes.
Summary
After a successful "Sign in with Google/Microsoft", Probo may redirect the browser to a
session-transfer URL that carries the user's root-session as a signed token in the query
string, so a trust-center *custom domain* can set its own cookie. The destination host is validated
only against the global set of all tenants' custom domains (`Trust.GetByDomainName`), and that
lookup returns unverified domains — a custom domain is created with no DNS-ownership proof and
is a normal Owner action. Combined with the fact that the OIDC `continue` URL is fully
attacker-chosen in the login-initiation link and is never bound to the authenticating victim, an
attacker can register a custom domain they control, send the victim an ordinary Probo OIDC login
link, and receive the victim's root-session token when the victim logs in — leading to **account
takeover of any user who clicks the link** (including OWNERs/ADMINs).
Root cause (source)
1 — `continue` is attacker-chosen and the redirect allowlist is the global custom-domain set
(`pkg/server/api/api.go:255-267`): the `allowedRedirectHost` / `isTrustCenterDomain` functions both
return true when `host == baseURL` or `Trust.GetByDomainName(ctx, host)` succeeds — i.e. for any
registered custom domain of any tenant.
2 — the session-transfer URL carries the victim's root session (`oidc_handler.go:206-246`):
redirectURL := h.safeRedirect.GetSafeRedirectURL(ctx, continueURL, defaultRedirect) // continueURL attacker-chosen
if transferURL, ok := h.buildSessionTransferURL(ctx, redirectURL, rootSession.ID.String()); ok {
http.Redirect(w, r, transferURL, http.StatusFound) // 302 to the attacker's custom domain
}
// buildSessionTransferURL: if h.isTrustCenterDomain(parsed.Host) { // any custom domain
// token := authn.SignSessionTransfer(sessionID /* victim ROOT session */, redirectURL, cookieSecret)
// -> https://<custom-domain>/api/trust/v1/session-transfer?token=<token>
// }3 — the destination lookup returns unverified domains (`GetByDomainName` → `LoadByDomain`,
`pkg/coredata/custom_domain.go`): the query is `WHERE <NoScope=TRUE> AND domain = @domain` — there is
no `ssl_status`/verified predicate, so a freshly-created, unverified domain is returned.
4 — custom domains require no ownership proof (`CreateCustomDomain`,
`pkg/probo/custom_domain_service.go`): the request validator checks only the domain format
(`validator.Domain()`); the service simply `Insert`s the row. It is an Owner action (`core:*`), which
anyone obtains by signing up for their own free organization. No DNS TXT/CNAME/ACME verification gates
its use in `GetByDomainName`.
5 — the session-transfer handler issues the victim's cookie to the token bearer
(`pkg/server/api/trust/v1/session_transfer_handler.go`):
claims, _ := authn.VerifySessionTransfer(token, h.cookieSecret)
session, _ := h.iam.SessionService.GetSession(ctx, gid.ParseGID(claims.SessionID))
h.sessionCookie.Set(w, session) // sets the victim's root-session cookie for whoever presents the tokenReachability (hop-by-hop)
- Attacker signs up for a free Probo organization (they are OWNER of their own org) and registers a
- Attacker sends the victim an ordinary Probo login link:
- On success, `oidc_handler` accepts the `continue` host (step 1/allowlist), builds the
- The victim's browser connects to `evil.attacker.com` (DNS → attacker's server); the attacker
- The attacker replays the token to `https://app.probo.com/api/trust/v1/session-transfer?token=…`;
Impact
Full account takeover of any Probo user who clicks an attacker-supplied OIDC login link — including
OWNERs and ADMINs — via a link that triggers only a *normal, expected* login with the victim's own
identity provider. No credential phishing and no interaction with the victim's IdP is required; the
victim simply logs in as usual.
Proof of concept (executed, benign)
`go test ./pkg/server/api/authn/ -run TestSessionXfer_TokenCarriesVictimRootSession -v` → PASS.
It calls the real `SignSessionTransfer(victimRootSessionID, "https://evil.attacker.com/…", secret)`
(exactly as `buildSessionTransferURL` does) and then `VerifySessionTransfer`, showing the token the
server hands to the attacker's `continue` host decodes back to the victim's root session id — i.e.
the token is a full-session bearer credential delivered in the URL. Combined with the source facts
(the allowlist accepts any unverified custom domain; the handler sets the victim's cookie from the
token), this yields account takeover. (The reviewing agent additionally exercised
`buildSessionTransferURL` end-to-end with the real `api.go` wiring, emitting the token to the attacker
host.) Benign sentinel values; no destructive activity. PoC attached (`sessionxfer_poc_test.go`).
Adversarial re-read
- *"`safeRedirect` blocks the attacker host."* Refuted: the allowed-host function returns true for any
- *"Custom domains must be DNS-verified first."* Refuted: `CreateCustomDomain` validates only the
- *"The token is signed, so the attacker can't forge it."* Correct and irrelevant — the attacker does
- *"The session-transfer only sets a cookie on the custom domain, not the app."* The attacker replays
- Resists refutation → CONFIRMED.
Preconditions
- Attacker can create a Probo organization (self-service) and register a custom domain (Owner action),
Remediation
- Bind the OIDC `continue`/redirect allowlist to the authenticating identity's own organization(s),
- Require DNS-ownership verification (and `ssl_status = active`) before a custom domain is returned
- Do not deliver a session credential in a URL: make the session-transfer token single-use
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogo.probo.inc/probo |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.216.1 afectada |
0.234.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mf-88r7-g6j9Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
