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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · cargo

GHSA-RFJ2-Q3H3-HM5J

Cargo extracting malicious crates can corrupt arbitrary files

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a 6 d de la divulgación
Exposición1.525 dDesde la divulgación, 16 sept 2022, 12:12 p. m.
Detección1.522 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.65.0
Parche 0.67.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
16 sept 22
22 sept 22
15 dic 22
8 nov 23
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
16 sept 22
3 oct 23
18 oct 24
3 nov 25
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-RFJ2-Q3H3-HM5J divulgada
Remediación Parche 0.65.0 cargo · 6 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 0.67.0 cargo · 90 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that Cargo did not prevent extracting some malformed packages downloaded from alternate registries. An attacker able to upload packages to an alternate registry could corrupt arbitary files when Cargo downloaded the package.

The severity of this vulnerability is "low" for users of alternate registries. Users relying on crates.io are not affected.

Note that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros.

Arbitrary file corruption

After a package is downloaded, Cargo extracts its source code in the `~/.cargo` folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it builds. To record when an extraction is successfull, Cargo writes "ok" to the `.cargo-ok` file at the root of the extracted source code once it extracted all the files.

It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages to contain a `.cargo-ok` *symbolic link*, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write "ok" into `.cargo-ok`, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with `ok`. This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package.

Affected versions

The vulnerability is present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it.

Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available [in the wg-security-response repository][patches] for people building their own toolchain.

Mitigations

We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities.

crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by design there as well.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Ori Hollander from JFrog Security Research for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy][policy].

We also want to thank Josh Triplett for developing the fixes, Weihang Lo for developing the tests, and Pietro Albini for writing this advisory. The disclosure was coordinated by Pietro Albini and Josh Stone.

[policy]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security
[patches]: https://github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/master/patches

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
cargo< 0.65.0
cargo≥ 0.66.0 < 0.67.0
0.65.0
0.66.0
0.67.0
0.100.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iocargo
Corregida 0.65.0, 0.67.0 6 d · 90 d 0.100.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.65.00.67.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36113
Otrahttps://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/security/advisories/GHSA-rfj2-q3h3-hm5j
Otrahttps://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/15f1e4b0bf4b4fc20369e0a85d9b77957c4dd52a
Otrahttps://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/97b80919e404b0768ea31ae329c3b4da54bed05a
Otrahttps://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/dafe4a7ea016739680ec7998aebe1bc6de131a5b
Otrahttps://github.com/rust-lang/cargo
Otrahttps://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202210-09

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