llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-RW3W-JP96-PR74

Zone name, type and master are writable through the API with only the record-content permission, which the web interface forbids

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
7.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Seguimiento de cerca: yo sé de mirar de cerca.Programa la remediación y duerme tranquilo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-RW3W-JP96-PR74 divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`PUT /api/v2/zones/{id}` writes a zone's `name`, `type` and `master` behind
`canEditZone()`, which is satisfied by the record-content permission
`zone_content_edit_own`. The web interface gates those same two settings behind a
different, stronger permission — `zone_meta_edit_*` — and offers no zone rename
at all. A user delegated the ability to edit records inside their own zone can
therefore rename that zone to any name not already present in the installation,
and repoint it as a `SLAVE` of a master server they control.

This is the class Poweradmin has already published as CWE-862: *the API does not
enforce a rule the web interface enforces* (CVE-2026-75591, HIGH, 2026-07-23).

Affected Component and Versions

`lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/ZonesController.php`, the `updateZone()`
handler. Present in v4.2.5, v4.3.4 and v4.4.0 — the three current release
branches — and in `main` at `425167acc`. Verified with
`git show <tag>:lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/ZonesController.php`: the
`canEditZone()` gate and the `$allowedFields = ['name','type','master']` list are
identical in all four.

Security Boundary and Preconditions

Stated plainly, because it decides the severity.

With only the four stock permission templates this is not a privilege gain.
Zone Manager already holds `zone_meta_edit_own` *and* `zone_master_add`, so it
loses nothing by going through the API; Editor cannot reach the handler at all.

It becomes a privilege gain on a delegated content-only template — one that
grants `zone_content_edit_own` without `zone_meta_edit_own`. That is an ordinary
thing to build in Poweradmin: permission templates are fully user-defined, and
"may edit the records in their own zone, may not change the zone itself" is the
obvious shape for delegating DNS record management to a customer or a team.
Poweradmin's own web UI is built around exactly that separation — which is why
`EditController` computes `$perm_meta_edit` separately in the first place.

This is the same shape of precondition the vendor accepted at HIGH for
CVE-2026-75591, which required an authenticated non-admin API user.

Technical Details

The API gate

`lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/ZonesController.php:672`:

if (!$this->permissionService->canEditZone($userId, $zoneId)) {

and `lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php:198-216`:

public function canEditZone(int $userId, int $zoneId): bool
{
    if ($this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_is_ueberuser')) {
        return true;
    }
    if ($this->userHasPermission($userId, 'zone_content_edit_others')) {
        return true;
    }
    if ($this->userHasPermission($userId, 'zone_content_edit_own')) {
        return $this->userOwnsZone($userId, $zoneId);   // content permission, meta write
    }
    return false;
}

Despite the name, `canEditZone()` is satisfied by the two content permissions.
It is the same predicate `canEditZoneRecord()` escalates to for `SOA`/`NS`
(`ApiPermissionService.php:276-282`) — so within this service it is the "stronger"
check for a record type, while being used here as the *only* check for a zone's
identity.

The handler then writes the three metadata fields,
`ZonesController.php:683-689`:

$allowedFields = ['name', 'type', 'master'];

foreach ($allowedFields as $field) {
    if (isset($input[$field])) {
        $updates[$field] = $input[$field];
    }
}

reaching the database at `:725` → `ZoneManagementService::updateZone` (`:183-202`)
→ `DbZoneRepository::updateZone` (`:1124-1147`).

The web twin, which separates them

`lib/Application/Controller/EditController.php:274-275`:

$perm_meta_edit = $this->permissionService->getZoneMetaEditPermissionLevel($userId);
$meta_edit = $perm_meta_edit == "all" || ($perm_meta_edit == "own" && $user_is_zone_owner == "1");

and `:286`:

if ($this->isPost() && $meta_edit) {
    // Change zone type            (:288-294)
    // Change slave master         (:297-301)
}

Zone type and slave master — two of the three fields the API writes — are
reachable in the web interface only with `zone_meta_edit_*`.

Rename exists nowhere else in the product

There is no zone rename in the web interface. And the project's own alternative
backend refuses the operation outright,
`lib/Infrastructure/Repository/ApiZoneRepository.php:812-817`:

if ($currentName !== null && $updates['name'] !== $currentName) {
    throw new \InvalidArgumentException(
        'Zone renaming is not supported in API backend mode. PowerDNS API does not support zone rename operations.'
    );
}

So the same product refuses a rename in one backend, never offers it in the web
UI, and performs it in the other backend on a content-level permission.

Reproduction

Executed over HTTP against a local lab — PHP 8.3, MySQL 8.4, the project's own
shipped schema, at `425167acc`. The account `contentop` holds
`zone_content_edit_own` only: no `zone_meta_edit_own`, no `zone_master_add`. Zone
3 is its own; zone 2 belongs to another tenant.

PUT /api/v2/zones/3  {"name":"bigbank.example"}                -> 200
PUT /api/v2/zones/3  {"type":"SLAVE","master":"203.0.113.66"}  -> 200
PUT /api/v2/zones/2  {"name":"evil.example"}                   -> 403   (control)

domains before: 3 | tenant.example  | MASTER | NULL
domains after:  3 | bigbank.example | SLAVE  | 203.0.113.66

The 403 on another tenant's zone is the matched control: ownership is still
enforced, so what fails here is the permission *level*, not the object scope.

Impact

A user with record-content rights on their own zone can:

  1. Claim any zone name not already present in the installation, bypassing
  2. Repoint the zone at a master they control by flipping it to `SLAVE`, so

The zone's identity and its source of truth are both attacker-chosen.

Argued, not executed: with `zone_content_edit_others` — a plausible "record
operator across all zones" template — `canEditZone()` returns true for *every*
zone (`ApiPermissionService.php:206-208`), so both writes apply installation-wide.
Only the `zone_content_edit_own` variant above was run.

Severity

High — CVSS 7.1

*Correction, added after submission: the body first said 6.5 Medium. That was
an arithmetic error on our side, not a change of position — the vector below is
the one submitted and is unchanged. `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L` scores
7.1, which is what this advisory displays.*

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`

CWE-862 — Missing Authorization
CWE-863 — Incorrect Authorization

  • AV:N — Poweradmin's HTTP API.
  • AC:L — one request per write. No race, no discovery, no prior state.
  • PR:L — an authenticated user on a content-only template. The precondition
  • UI:N — no action by any other user.
  • S:U — the impact stays within Poweradmin's authority. A case for `S:C`
  • C:N — no disclosure in this finding.
  • I:H — the zone's name and its source of truth are both rewritten. This is
  • A:L — a `MASTER` → `SLAVE` flip stops the zone being served from local data

Remediation

Two changes in `ZonesController::updateZone()`:

  1. Gate `type` and `master` on the zone-meta permission rather than
  2. Refuse `name` outright, matching both the web interface and

The deeper point, offered rather than insisted on: `canEditZone()` reads as a
zone-level check and is satisfied by two content-level permissions. It is used in
two places that mean different things — the escalation target for `SOA`/`NS`
record writes, and the sole gate on zone metadata. A name that says which of the
two it grants would make the next handler harder to get wrong.

References

  • `lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/ZonesController.php:672, 683-689, 725`
  • `lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php:198-216, 276-282`
  • `lib/Application/Controller/EditController.php:274-275, 286, 288-294, 297-301`
  • `lib/Infrastructure/Repository/ApiZoneRepository.php:812-817`
  • `lib/Domain/Service/ZoneManagementService.php:183-202`
  • `lib/Infrastructure/Repository/DbZoneRepository.php:1124-1147`
  • CVE-2026-75591 — the same class: an API path not enforcing a web-side rule

Maintainer note

I checked the affected range on this one and moved the lower bound. The v2 zones
controller only appeared in 4.1.0, so anything on 4.0.x and earlier never had this
endpoint at all. The upper bound is unchanged. Worth adding that the v1 zones endpoint
reached the same fields through the same check, so that got the metadata gate too - v1
is gone on the development branch already but it still ships on the release branches.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.1.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.1.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-rw3w-jp96-pr74

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.