GHSA-RX82-4P2J-J5CV
`Name::hash` discards label boundaries; `ValidationCacheKey(u64)` reuses the digest in `Eq` implementation, leaking an Insecure DNSSEC verdict across distinct owner names
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-RX82-4P2J-J5CV divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 0.26.2 | hickory-net · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Reporter: Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks
Summary
`hickory_proto::rr::Name`'s `Hash` implementation only incorporates the contents of labels, not the length of labels, so it is trivial to find collisions by moving dots around. `hickory_net::dnssec` then uses that hash in `struct ValidationCacheKey(u64)` with `#[derive(Eq, PartialEq)]`, so equal hashes are treated as a cache hit. An attacker who controls an unsigned (Insecure) delegation for a domain name that differs only in the position of dots from a target name in a signed zone can prime the validation cache with a benign `Proof::Insecure` verdict, then forge an answer for the target name. The resolver re-uses the colliding cache entry, skips `verify_default_rrset()` entirely, and returns the forged RDATA as `NOERROR`/AD=0 instead of returning `SERVFAIL`.
It is also possible to use the differences between the `Hash` and `PartialEq` implementations of `Name` to mount a HashDoS attack.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iohickory-net |
Corregida | 0.26.2 | 0 d | 0.26.3 no afectada |
0.26.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-rx82-4p2j-j5cvLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
