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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-RXCR-HMMJ-6J2C

Anonymous visitors can inherit signed-in sessions from shared HTTP caches

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones1.7.53.7 · 2.2.18
Exposición20 dDesde la divulgación, 31 oct 2026, 4:05 p. m.
Detección18 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
31 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
31 oct 26
6 nov 26
11 nov 26
16 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-RXCR-HMMJ-6J2C divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Grav sends page media files (and, when lazy sessions are enabled, rendered pages) with the visitor's session cookie and a one-week shared-cacheable `Cache-Control` header. Behind a shared HTTP cache that stores responses carrying `Set-Cookie`, an anonymous visitor who requests the same URL is handed the session cookie of the signed-in user who fetched it first, and the site accepts that cookie as that user.

Affected versions

Grav 2.x from 2.0.0 up to and including 2.2.17, and Grav 1.7 up to and including 1.7.53.6. The cache headers were added in Grav 1.1.0. Only sites that run a shared cache that stores `Set-Cookie` responses are exposed, for example Apache `mod_cache` with a plain `CacheEnable`. nginx `proxy_cache` and Varnish with its default configuration are documented to refuse such responses (not tested here), so a default deployment of those is unlikely to be affected.

Details

Every Grav request starts a session, and the session layer re-sends the cookie of a visitor who already has one. When a file in a page folder is served through the media fallback, `Utils::download()` replaces the restrictive headers PHP set for the session with `Cache-Control: max-age=604800` (no `private`) and `Pragma: cache`, and the response carrying `Set-Cookie` goes out cacheable by anyone. Rendered pages get the same directive from the page header code, and leak the same way when `system.session.lazy` is on.

The attacker does not need to wait for a logged-in user to populate a cache entry. The query string is part of the cache key but is ignored when a file is downloaded, so a link such as `/typography/manual.pdf?x=1` that a signed-in user is persuaded to open stores their session under a URL only the attacker knows. The click is a top-level navigation, on which browsers send a `SameSite=Lax` cookie. The reproducer put Apache `mod_cache` in front of the demo site, signed `admin` in at `/login`, opened the media URL, and then showed an anonymous request for that URL receiving the admin's cookie from the cache, after which `GET /api/v1/me` answered with `username: admin` and `super_admin: true`. With the default configuration the leak also affects cookieless visitors: the cache stores the new session cookie created for a first anonymous visitor and hands the same session to every later visitor of that URL.

The victim has to be signed in through the front-end `/login` form. A user who only signed in to Admin2 with API tokens is not exposed, so the realistic victims are front-end members, plus any administrator who also uses the front-end login.

Impact

An anonymous visitor can take over a signed-in session, with that user's privileges, for as long as the session lives (30 minutes by default). It is rated High, not Critical, because it needs a shared cache that stores cookie-bearing responses, which common cache setups refuse, and a victim who signed in through the front-end login.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 2.2.18 and 1.7.53.7. A response that carries `Set-Cookie` is now marked `private`, and any `public` or `s-maxage` directive is dropped, while other directives that are already present (such as `no-store`) and the shorter `max-age` are kept. This is enforced for media downloads, regular and Flex pages, and again where PHP sends the final headers, so explicit `cache_control` values and late header changes are covered. Responses without a cookie stay cacheable.

Workarounds

Configure the shared cache not to store `Set-Cookie` headers or not to cache responses that set cookies (for Apache `mod_cache`, `CacheIgnoreHeaders Set-Cookie`), or serve static media from a path that bypasses Grav.

Credits

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-4P0O5Z6I).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav< 1.7.53.7
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.2.18
1.7.53.7
2.0.0
2.2.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 1.7.53.7, 2.2.18 — —
Versiones corregidas1.7.53.72.2.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-rxcr-hmmj-6j2c

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.