GHSA-V359-JJ2V-J536
vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.17.0 | vllm · -2 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-V359-JJ2V-J536 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.
Affected Component
- File: `vllm/connections.py`
- Function: `load_from_url_async`
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The SSRF fix https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746 uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing.
These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently:
| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%5C@evil.com/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path |
| `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator |
Attack Scenario
# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"
# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation
# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
# Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass!Why This Happens
- yarl: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/`
- urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%5C@evil.com/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org`
This inconsistency allows an attacker to:
- Bypass the hostname allowlist check
- Access arbitrary internal/external services
- Perform full SSRF attacks
Fixes
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypivllm |
Corregida | 0.17.0 | -2 d | 0.34.0 no afectada |
0.17.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25960https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfchttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/6f3b2047abd4a748e3db4a68543f8221358002c0https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25960https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2445892https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3411.yamlhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllmhttps://pypi.org/project/vllmVer 1 referencias más
https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-25960.jsonLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
