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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nukeviet/nukeviet

GHSA-V58R-XG67-JJ45

SQL Injection in admin/language/write.php via dirlang parameter (column-position concat)

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CVSS 3.1
4.1
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición50 dDesde la divulgación, 1 oct 2026, 7:10 p. m.
Detección48 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Sin prisa pero sin pausa, como yo en el páramo.Ni fuego ni humo: solo una tarea pendiente.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 oct 26
14 oct 26
27 oct 26
8 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-V58R-XG67-JJ45 divulgada · CVSS 4.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`admin/language/write.php` concatenates the `dirlang` GET parameter directly into the column list of two `SELECT` statements without validating it. `dirlang` only passes through `Request::get_title()` (`strip_tags()` plus, in this call, no entity encoding) and is never checked against the `^[a-z]{2}$` pattern that every other operation in the language module enforces. Arbitrary SQL expressions can therefore be appended to the selected columns and executed.

Exploitation requires an authenticated God Admin session. See *Attack prerequisites* below — this is the reason the advisory is not rated higher.

Affected code

Both sinks are inside `nv_admin_write_lang()`:

// admin/language/write.php:27
list($module, $admin_file, $langtype, $author_lang) =
    $db->query('SELECT module, admin_file, langtype, author_' . $dirlang
        . ' FROM ' . NV_LANGUAGE_GLOBALTABLE . '_file WHERE idfile =' . (int) $idfile)->fetch(3);

// admin/language/write.php:97
$result = $db->query('SELECT langtype, lang_key, lang_' . $dirlang
    . ' FROM ' . NV_LANGUAGE_GLOBALTABLE . ' WHERE idfile=' . $idfile
    . ' ORDER BY langtype ASC, id ASC');

The `idfile,checksess` branch that reaches this code performs no validation on `dirlang`, while the sibling `writeallfile` branch in the same file already does:

// admin/language/write.php:167
if ($dirlang != '' and preg_match('/^([a-z]{2})$/', $dirlang)) {

The same check is present in `delete.php`, `download.php`, `edit.php`, `interface.php` and `read.php`. `write.php` was the only operation in the module missing it.

The `$page_title = $language_array[$dirlang]['name'];` lookup that precedes the vulnerable branch does not block the request: it raises `E_WARNING`, and the error handler only terminates on `E_USER_ERROR`.

Attack prerequisites

`op=write` is registered only for God Admin accounts, and only when the installation is not a sub-site:

// admin/language/functions.php
if (empty($global_config['idsite'])) {
    ...
    if (defined('NV_IS_GODADMIN')) {
        $allow_func[] = 'setting';
        $allow_func[] = 'write';
        $allow_func[] = 'delete';
    }
}

This is enforced in `admin/index.php` by `in_array($op, $allow_func, true)`, which returns 404 otherwise. A regular administrator cannot reach the vulnerable code.

The request also requires `checksess = md5($idfile . NV_CHECK_SESSION)`, where `NV_CHECK_SESSION = md5(NV_CACHE_PREFIX . session_id)`. These tokens are rendered on the `op=interface` page, which requires the same God Admin privilege. Because the token is unpredictable to a third party, there is no practical cross-site request forgery chain against this endpoint, despite `GET` requests not being subject to the Referer/Origin check applied to `POST`.

Proof of concept

Against a lab instance with `idfile=37` (one row in `nv_language`), authenticated as God Admin:

# baseline
time curl -s -G -b /tmp/nv_admin.txt --max-time 25 \
  --data-urlencode "language=en" --data-urlencode "nv=language" --data-urlencode "op=write" \
  --data-urlencode "idfile=37" --data-urlencode "checksess=<token>" \
  --data-urlencode "dirlang=en" \
  "http://127.0.0.1:8088/admin/index.php"
# => 200, ~0.02s

# payload
time curl -s -G -b /tmp/nv_admin.txt --max-time 25 \
  --data-urlencode "language=en" --data-urlencode "nv=language" --data-urlencode "op=write" \
  --data-urlencode "idfile=37" --data-urlencode "checksess=<token>" \
  --data-urlencode "dirlang=en,(SELECT SLEEP(4))" \
  "http://127.0.0.1:8088/admin/index.php"
# => 200, ~8.0s  (two SELECTs x SLEEP(4) x one row)

Boolean-based and error-based variants are also viable; an invalid expression produces a 500 with the SQL error rendered by XTemplate.

Note that payloads must be quote-less: `Request::security_get()` converts `'` and `"` to HTML entities before the value reaches the query. This does not prevent extraction — subqueries, `SUBSTRING`/`ASCII` comparisons and hex literals all work without quotes — but it does rule out string literals.

Impact

An attacker who already holds a God Admin session can read any table the database user can `SELECT`. Both sinks are `SELECT` only, so no rows can be written or deleted through them.

The practical impact is limited by the privilege required. A God Admin can already read the same data through the administration interface, and can already write arbitrary PHP to disk through the `file_put_contents()` call in this very script. The vulnerability therefore grants no capability that the attacker does not already possess, and does not enable privilege escalation. It is being fixed because the missing validation is inconsistent with the rest of the module and because defence in depth should not rely on the `$allow_func` restriction remaining unchanged.

Path traversal (not exploitable)

`dirlang` is also concatenated into the language file path passed to `file_put_contents()`. This is not exploitable: `Request::security_get()` strips `../` from all GET values, and a payload containing `.` would in any case fail the query at line 27 before the write is reached.

Patch

Validation is applied at two points. At the entry point, before `$page_title` and before either `nv_mkdir()` call, so that every branch of the script is covered:

if (!preg_match('/^([a-z]{2})$/', $dirlang) or !isset($language_array[$dirlang])) {
    nv_redirect_location(NV_BASE_ADMINURL . 'index.php?' . NV_LANG_VARIABLE . '=' . NV_LANG_DATA . '&' . NV_NAME_VARIABLE . '=' . $module_name . '&' . NV_OP_VARIABLE . '=main');
}

And inside `nv_admin_write_lang()` itself, so that future callers cannot reintroduce the issue:

if (!preg_match('/^([a-z]{2})$/', $dirlang) or !isset($language_array[$dirlang])) {
    return $lang_module['nv_error_exit_module'];
}

`$language_array` is loaded from `includes/ini/langs.ini` in `admin/language/functions.php` and contains every language known to NukeViet, not only the installed ones, so validating against it does not prevent adding a new language.

Affected versions

All 4.x releases. The pattern dates back to commit `dc6b42a` (2015).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
3.6/ 10Bajo
Vector 3.6 (difícil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Versiones afectadas

4.5.064.5.114.6.004.6.01
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnukeviet/nukeviet
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-v58r-xg67-jj45

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.