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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/omec-project/amf

GHSA-V6W5-38CF-PCV8

Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
4.9
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición5 hDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 7:20 p. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
11:02 a. m.
07:20 p. m.
12:48 a. m.
11:02 a. m.
02:28 p. m.
05:55 p. m.
09:21 p. m.
12:48 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-V6W5-38CF-PCV8 divulgada · CVSS 4.9 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).

The defect

ngap/handler.go:

if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {                                                                              // line 3267, PRESENCE only
    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)   // line 3268
    ... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}

Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared `aper:"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16"`. Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then `if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil }` returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.

Verification

Proven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decode cleanly through the REAL APER decoder, and the handler's exact expression then panics with "index out of range [0] with length 0". Panic discipline was checked first: the NGAP receive path has NO recover() (the only recover in the package is on SendToRan, the transmit path), so this is a genuine process kill and the AMF terminates.

Attacker model, stated conservatively: a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface, which additionally needs one registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. This is NOT reachable by a bare over-the-air UE; the realistic scenario is a compromised or malicious base station, the threat model N2 security exists to address.

Suggested fix

Check the length of Bytes before indexing, in all six places, and treat a short or empty bit string as a malformed IE with a PathSwitchRequestFailure rather than proceeding. More durably: since the SIZE constraint is waived on the extension path by design, no aper-decoded bit string can be assumed non-empty, so the same check is needed anywhere else a decoded bit string is indexed. Deduplicated against all eleven existing omec advisories and against hardening commit 030fe7c, which enumerated its sites and MISSED this handler.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic was reproduced by driving the real APER decoder with crafted bytes and then the handler's exact expression, and the absence of recover() on the receive path was verified by enumeration rather than assumed. The reporter separately confirmed the six unguarded index-zero reads behind a presence-only check at HEAD.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/omec-project/amf< 1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0
v1.7.0
1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/omec-project/amf
Sin parche — — v1.7.0 afectada
Versiones corregidascommit d28042a
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102945
Otrahttps://github.com/omec-project/amf/security/advisories/GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8
Otrahttps://github.com/omec-project/amf/pull/767
Otrahttps://github.com/omec-project/amf/commit/d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c
Otrahttps://github.com/omec-project/amf
Otrahttps://github.com/omec-project/amf/releases/tag/v3.1.6

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