GHSA-V6W5-38CF-PCV8
Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-V6W5-38CF-PCV8 divulgada · CVSS 4.9 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories | Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).
The defect
ngap/handler.go:
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil { // line 3267, PRESENCE only
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7) // line 3268
... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared `aper:"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16"`. Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then `if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil }` returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.
Verification
Proven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decode cleanly through the REAL APER decoder, and the handler's exact expression then panics with "index out of range [0] with length 0". Panic discipline was checked first: the NGAP receive path has NO recover() (the only recover in the package is on SendToRan, the transmit path), so this is a genuine process kill and the AMF terminates.
Attacker model, stated conservatively: a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface, which additionally needs one registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. This is NOT reachable by a bare over-the-air UE; the realistic scenario is a compromised or malicious base station, the threat model N2 security exists to address.
Suggested fix
Check the length of Bytes before indexing, in all six places, and treat a short or empty bit string as a malformed IE with a PathSwitchRequestFailure rather than proceeding. More durably: since the SIZE constraint is waived on the extension path by design, no aper-decoded bit string can be assumed non-empty, so the same check is needed anywhere else a decoded bit string is indexed. Deduplicated against all eleven existing omec advisories and against hardening commit 030fe7c, which enumerated its sites and MISSED this handler.
Tooling
AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic was reproduced by driving the real APER decoder with crafted bytes and then the handler's exact expression, and the absence of recover() on the receive path was verified by enumeration rather than assumed. The reporter separately confirmed the six unguarded index-zero reads behind a presence-only check at HEAD.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/omec-project/amf |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.7.0 afectada |
commit d28042aArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102945https://github.com/omec-project/amf/security/advisories/GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8https://github.com/omec-project/amf/pull/767https://github.com/omec-project/amf/commit/d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4chttps://github.com/omec-project/amfhttps://github.com/omec-project/amf/releases/tag/v3.1.6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
