GHSA-V7HQ-28RV-QH3P
LAPR: delete_account and update_account_policy skip the folder authorization check, allowing any operator to weaken or unmanage any account
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-V7HQ-28RV-QH3P divulgada · CVSS 7.7 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Two mutating LAPR handlers, `delete_account` and `update_account_policy`, are the only account handlers that are not passed the session object and therefore perform no folder-scope authorization. Any user holding `can_manage_lapr` can retarget any managed account — including accounts on endpoints and in folders they cannot access — onto a rotation policy of their choosing, or remove the account from management entirely.
Details
In `app/sources/lapr_accounts.queries.php` the dispatch omits `$session` for exactly these two cases:
case 'delete_account':
laprDeleteAccount($dataReceived, $userId, $lang);
break;
case 'update_account_policy':
laprUpdateAccountPolicy($dataReceived, $userId, $lang);
break;while their four siblings (`add_account`, `start_rotation`, `reset_account`, `list_account_history`) all receive it and call `laprUserCanWriteFolder()` / `laprUserCanReadFolder()` on the target item's folder. Neither function looks up the account's item or folder at all.
The load-bearing impact is `update_account_policy`. Rotation policies are global objects; any LAPR operator can create one. An attacker creates a policy with the weakest parameters the validator accepts (minimum length, a single character class) and a short frequency, then assigns it to a privileged account they cannot otherwise touch. `laprComputeNextRotation()` clamps a past result to `now`, so the next scheduler tick rotates that account to a trivially weak secret:
$nextRotation = laprComputeNextRotation($account['last_rotation_at'], $frequencyDays);This is an integrity attack on live credential material, not a denial of service: the privileged Linux account genuinely ends up holding a weak password, and it keeps being reset to a weak password on every cycle.
`delete_account` additionally lets any operator silently stop rotation on any account and cancel its queued rotation tasks.
PoC
- Bob holds `can_manage_lapr` with access to one unrelated folder.
- Bob calls `list_accounts` (also unscoped) and reads the id of a `root` account managed by another team.
- Bob creates a policy: minimum length, lowercase only, frequency 1 day.
- Bob calls `update_account_policy` with that account id and his policy id. No folder check runs.
- `next_rotation_at` is clamped to now; the scheduler rotates the remote `root` password to a short single-character-class secret within one tick.
Impact
Authorization bypass allowing an authenticated LAPR operator to degrade the strength of credentials for privileged Linux accounts outside their scope, or to remove those accounts from rotation. Affects all installations with LAPR enabled.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Versiones afectadas
3.2.2.0Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-v7hq-28rv-qh3pLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
