GHSA-VC32-4GWF-77XP
Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VC32-4GWF-77XP divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
An OTP-enabled authenticated user who cannot use the HTTP configuration mutation endpoints without a valid secure session can still mutate Nginx configuration through `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` using only ordinary authentication.
### Details
The HTTP configuration mutation surface is explicitly grouped behind `middleware.RequireSecureSession()`. By contrast, the MCP endpoints are exposed with only `middleware.AuthRequired()`. The MCP server exposes configuration mutation tools including `nginx_config_add` and `nginx_config_modify`, so OTP-enabled users gain an alternate path around the intended step-up requirement.
Relevant code paths:
- [api/config/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/config/router.go:14)
- [internal/middleware/secure_session.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/secure_session.go:52)
- [mcp/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/router.go:9)
- [mcp/config/config_add.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_add.go:34)
- [mcp/config/config_modify.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_modify.go:55)
This is a security-control bypass rather than a missing feature. The product already established that OTP-enabled users should complete a secure session before high-impact configuration mutations are accepted on the HTTP path.
### PoC
I verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary end-to-end harness that exercised the real `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` routes.
What the executed test did:
1. Created a temporary config directory and configured Nginx control commands to harmless local values (`true`) to avoid touching the host.
2. Created a real OTP-enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.
3. Generated a real JWT for that OTP-enabled user.
4. Started a local test server exposing the real `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` routes.
5. Opened an authenticated SSE connection to `/mcp` with the JWT and no `X-Secure-Session-ID`.
6. Initialized the MCP session over `/mcp_message`.
7. Called the real `nginx_config_add` tool over `/mcp_message`.
8. Verified that the tool succeeded and created `mcp-bypass.conf` in the managed config directory without any secure-session step-up.
Observed result from the actual local verification:
- The MCP session initialized successfully without any `X-Secure-Session-ID`.
- The config file was written through the MCP tool path using only JWT authentication.
### Impact
OTP-enabled accounts lose the intended step-up protection for high-impact Nginx configuration changes when MCP is enabled. A user who should be blocked until re-authenticating can still create or modify configuration files and trigger reload behavior through MCP.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 afectada |
commit 23d1934Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84360https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xphttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-uihttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
