GHSA-VFF9-46WW-FJJM
Broken Object-Level Authorization (IDOR) in motion search job endpoints allows cross-camera data access
Texto original en inglés · Ver en español
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VFF9-46WW-FJJM divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
A restricted user (limited to specific cameras by role) can retrieve motion search results and cancel jobs belonging to cameras outside their permitted set, by supplying any known `job_id` with a `camera_name` they are authorized for. The authorization check validates the URL path parameter instead of the job's actual camera field.
Details
`get_motion_search_status_endpoint` and `cancel_motion_search_endpoint` in `frigate/api/motion_search.py` (lines 163-274) are gated by `Depends(require_camera_access)`, which validates the caller's permission for the `camera_name` in the URL path. However, `get_motion_search_job(job_id)` in `frigate/jobs/motion_search.py:914` retrieves the job from a global dict keyed only by `job_id` — it never verifies that the job's own `camera` field matches the `camera_name` the caller was authorized for.
The authorization check and data access are validating two different objects: the URL parameter vs. the actual job. This is the same bug class as CVE-2026-33470.
For comparison, the VLM watch job feature in `frigate/api/chat.py:1512-1531` does this correctly — it calls `await require_camera_access(job.camera, request=request)`, checking access against the job's own camera field rather than a caller-supplied path parameter.
PoC
Prerequisites: A Frigate instance with role-based camera access configured. User A has access to `front_yard` only. User B (or admin) has started a motion search job on `server_room`, producing `job_id` = `a1b2c3d4e5f6`.
- As User A, call:
GET /api/front_yard/search/motion/a1b2c3d4e5f6
- `require_camera_access` checks `front_yard` — User A is authorized, so it passes.
- `get_motion_search_job("a1b2c3d4e5f6")` returns the `server_room` job. The response includes motion timestamps, change percentages, progress, and metrics for a camera User A has no access to.
- User A can also cancel the job:
POST /api/front_yard/search/motion/a1b2c3d4e5f6/cancel
Impact
This is a Broken Object-Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability. Any authenticated user with access to at least one camera can read motion activity data (precise timestamps and magnitude of movement) for any other camera, and cancel in-progress search jobs on those cameras. This discloses surveillance/presence information and allows disruption of other users' jobs. Multi-tenant and role-restricted Frigate deployments are affected.
This issue was reported by Mayssare Amakhtari @cy3erm https://github.com/cy3erm.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypifrigate |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.7.0 no afectada |
0.18.0-beta3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/security/advisories/GHSA-vff9-46ww-fjjmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
