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GHSA-VQVG-86CC-CG83

OpenClaw: Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -5 d de la divulgación
Exposición236 dDesde la divulgación, 30 mar 2026, 1:59 p. m.
Detección231 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
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Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 2026.3.24
Monitoreo
Detectada
25 mar 26
30 mar 26
8 jul 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
25 mar 26
25 may 26
24 jul 26
22 sept 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 2026.3.24 openclaw · -5 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-VQVG-86CC-CG83 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Title
Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement

CWE
CWE-862 Missing Authorization

CVSS v3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Base score: 6.5 (Medium)

Severity Assessment
Medium. This is a real authorization flaw in OpenClaw’s internal control plane. The issue does not require host access, trusted local state tampering, or multi-tenant assumptions, but exploitation does require an already authenticated internal Gateway caller with `operator.write`.

Impact
An authenticated internal Gateway caller limited to `operator.write` can perform state-changing `/allowlist` actions without `operator.admin`, even though comparable mutating internal chat commands already require `operator.admin`. The reachable effects are persistent changes to config-backed `allowFrom` entries and pairing-store-backed allowlist entries.

This is not a semantic-modeling complaint and not a generic “trusted operator can do things” claim. It is a missing authorization check inside OpenClaw’s own internal scope model, where peer mutating command surfaces already distinguish `operator.write` from `operator.admin`.

Affected Component
Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`.

Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag:
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:251-254`
- `/allowlist` authorization uses only `rejectUnauthorizedCommand(...)`.
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-524`
- mutating config and pairing-store writes happen here, but there is no `requireGatewayClientScopeForInternalChannel(..., operator.admin, ...)`.

Reachability and scope model:
- `src/gateway/method-scopes.ts:94-109`
- `chat.send` is a write-scoped method.
- `src/gateway/server.chat.gateway-server-chat.test.ts:539-559`
- existing runtime coverage proves `chat.send` routes slash commands without an agent run.
- `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:574-577`
- internal callers become `senderIsOwner` only when `GatewayClientScopes` includes `operator.admin`.

Comparable internal mutating command paths already enforce `operator.admin`:
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-config.ts:64-73`
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-mcp.ts:89-96`
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-plugins.ts:387-394`
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.ts:98-106`

Version history:
- Introduced by commit `555b2578a8cc6e1b93f717496935ead97bfbed8b` (`feat: add /allowlist command`)
- Earliest released affected tag found: `v2026.1.20`
- Latest released affected tag verified: `v2026.3.23`

Technical Reproduction
1. Check out the shipped release tag `v2026.3.23`.
2. Use an internal command context with:
- `Provider = "webchat"`
- `Surface = "webchat"`
- `GatewayClientScopes = ["operator.write"]`
- `params.command.channel = "webchat"`
3. Route a slash command through `chat.send`.
4. Execute either of these mutating commands:
- `/allowlist add dm channel=telegram 789`
- `/allowlist add dm --store channel=telegram 789`
5. Confirm the command context is authorized but not owner-equivalent:
- `isAuthorizedSender === true`
- `senderIsOwner === false`
6. Observe that the commands still succeed and perform persistent writes.

Demonstrated Impact
The vulnerable handler performs real state mutation for a low-scope internal caller:
- Config-backed mutation path:
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:398-503`
- reads the config snapshot, applies the edit, validates, and writes the updated config to disk.
- Store-backed mutation path:
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:479-485`
- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:513-518`
- updates the pairing-store allowlist without any admin-scope gate.

The result is successful persistence, not just a misleading success message.

Environment
- Product: OpenClaw
- Verified shipped tag: `v2026.3.23`
- Shipped tag commit: `ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`
- Published GitHub release time: `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`
- Verification date: `2026-03-24`

Duplicate Check
This is not a duplicate of:
- `GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg`
- that advisory covered cross-account scoping in `/allowlist ... --store`, not missing internal `operator.admin` enforcement.
- `GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm`
- that advisory covered `/config` writes through `chat.send`, not `/allowlist`.
- `GHSA-3w6x-gv34-mqpf`
- same authorization class, but different command path (`/acp`, not `/allowlist`).

In Scope Check
This report is in scope under `SECURITY.md` because:
- it does not rely on adversarial operators sharing one gateway host or config;
- it does not target the HTTP compatibility endpoints that `SECURITY.md` explicitly treats as full operator-access surfaces;
- it demonstrates a real authorization mismatch inside OpenClaw’s own internal control-plane scope model (`operator.write` vs `operator.admin`);
- peer mutating internal chat commands already enforce `operator.admin`, so this is not a request for a new boundary but a missing check on an existing one.

This is therefore a concrete authorization bug, not a trusted-operator hardening suggestion.

Remediation Advice
1. Add `requireGatewayClientScopeForInternalChannel(..., allowedScopes: ["operator.admin"], ...)` to the mutating internal `/allowlist` paths.
2. Add regression coverage for both mutation modes:
- internal `operator.write` must be rejected;
- internal `operator.admin` must be allowed.
3. Cover both config-backed and store-backed writes.
4. Audit other mutating internal chat-command paths for the same missing-scope pattern.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
openclaw< 2026.3.24
2026.3.24
2026.11.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmopenclaw
Corregida 2026.3.24 -5 d 2026.11.3 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2026.3.24
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vqvg-86cc-cg83
Otrahttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw

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