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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/free5gc/amf

GHSA-VRRX-58H3-PRMH

Free5GC AMF has Missing Concurrent NAS SMC Validation During NGAP Handover

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a 4 d de la divulgación
Exposición196 dDesde la divulgación, 6 may 2026, 8:56 p. m.
Detección194 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v1.4.4
Monitoreo
Detectada
7 may 26
11 may 26
25 jun 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
7 may 26
25 jun 26
13 ago 26
1 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-VRRX-58H3-PRMH divulgada
Remediación Parche v1.4.4 github.com/free5gc/amf · 4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The AMF in Free5GC v4.2.1 does not enforce the concurrent security procedure rules defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 §6.9.5.1. The AMF does not check for ongoing N2 handover procedures before initiating a NAS Security Mode Command, and vice versa. This can lead to mismatches between NAS and AS security contexts in the network and the UE.

Details

Vulnerability Type: CWE-358 (Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard)

Affected File: `internal/ngap/handler.go` — `handleHandoverRequiredMain()` and `internal/gmm/sm.go` — `SecurityMode()`

Root Cause:

3GPP TS 33.501 §6.9.5.1 states:

> "Concurrent runs of security procedures may, in certain situations, lead to mismatches between security contexts in the network and the UE. In order to avoid such mismatches, the following rules shall be adhered to:
> 1. AMF shall not initiate any of the N2 procedures including a new key towards a UE if a NAS Security Mode Command procedure is ongoing with the UE.
> 2. The AMF shall not initiate a NAS Security Mode Command towards a UE if one of the N2 procedures including a new key is ongoing with the UE."

Free5GC AMF uses an `OnGoing` state tracking mechanism (`SetOnGoing()`, `GetOnGoing()`) with `OnGoingProcedureN2Handover` type. However, the cross-procedure checks required by §6.9.5.1 are not implemented:

Rule 2 violation:
`SecurityMode()` in `internal/gmm/sm.go` sends SMC on `EntryEvent` without checking if N2 handover is ongoing.

Rule 1 violation:
`handleHandoverRequiredMain()` in `internal/ngap/handler.go` calls `SetOnGoing(OnGoingProcedureN2Handover)` without checking if SMC is ongoing.

Why NH/NCC and SMC are related:

SMC activates a new KAMF, which changes the basis for NH key derivation. The N2 HandoverRequest includes NH/NCC derived from the old KAMF. If both procedures run concurrently, the target gNB and UE derive different KgNB keys, breaking AS security.

PoC

Source code evidence:

Free5GC AMF `internal/gmm/sm.go` — `SecurityMode()`:

func SecurityMode(state *fsm.State, event fsm.EventType, args fsm.ArgsType) {
    switch event {
    case fsm.EntryEvent:
        // No check for OnGoing N2 procedure
        // Directly proceeds to SMC

Free5GC AMF `internal/ngap/handler.go` — `handleHandoverRequiredMain()`:

amfUe.SetOnGoing(sourceUe.Ran.AnType, &context.OnGoing{
    Procedure: context.OnGoingProcedureN2Handover,
})
// No check for ongoing SMC before setting N2

Packet Evidence (pcap available):

| Packet | Time | Message | Description |
|--------|------|---------|-------------|
| #1 | 0.000s | HandoverRequired | gNB_A requests handover |
| #18 | 0.002s | HandoverRequest | N2 started (NH/NCC included) |
| | | *(no response from gNB_B)* | N2 ongoing |
| #28 | 2.062s | Registration request | UE re-registers (same SUPI) |
| #63 | 2.069s | Authentication request | |
| #64 | 2.070s | Authentication response | |
| #71 | 2.072s | Security mode command | SMC during N2 ongoing = Rule 2 violation |
NGAPHandover-N2-SMC-Concurrent.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26735421/NGAPHandover-N2-SMC-Concurrent.zip

Impact

Integrity (MEDIUM): Concurrent NAS and AS security procedures can cause security context mismatches between UE, AMF, and gNB. The SMC activates a new KAMF while the N2 HandoverRequest carries NH/NCC derived from the old KAMF, resulting in KgNB derivation mismatch.

Availability (LOW): Security context mismatch may cause handover failure or security verification failures.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/free5gc/amf≤ 1.4.3
1.4.3
v1.4.6
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/free5gc/amf
Corregida v1.4.4 4 d v1.4.6 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv1.4.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42082
Otrahttps://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-vrrx-58h3-prmh
Otrahttps://github.com/free5gc/amf/blame/v1.4.3/internal/gmm/sm.go
Otrahttps://github.com/free5gc/amf/blame/v1.4.3/internal/ngap/handler.go
Otrahttps://github.com/free5gc/free5gc

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