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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav-plugin-api

GHSA-VV8M-JQPM-38X4

Target-super guards ignore group-inherited super

Parche disponible
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CVSS 4.0
8.7
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones1.0.20 · 1.10.56 · 3.9.3
Exposición90 dDesde la divulgación, 21 ago 2026, 6:08 a. m.
Detección89 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
21 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 ago 26
13 sept 26
5 oct 26
28 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-VV8M-JQPM-38X4 divulgada · CVSS 8.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
Every "is the target a super-admin?" guard in Grav's user-management surface decides by reading the target account's own `access` map (`accessGrantsSuper($target->get('access'))` and equivalents). Grav's actual authorization resolves group-inherited access as part of an account's effective permissions (`UserTrait::authorize()` and `UserObject::authorize()` in core, `PermissionResolver` in the API plugin). An account that holds super only through group membership — its own `access` contains no super flag — is completely invisible to these guards.

A non-super user manager (`api.access` + `api.users.write`) can therefore `PATCH` such an account's password and take it over, while the same request against an account with a direct super flag is correctly rejected with 403. All prior fixes in this area (GHSA-p97c, GHSA-94q7, GHSA-8gg4, GHSA-22p9, GHSA-985r) read only the target's own access — none considered group inheritance, so this bypasses that entire fix line.

Threat model: a lower-privilege actor (the documented user-manager delegation tier) gains control of a super-admin account.

### Affected versions
The vulnerable code lives entirely in plugins; the `getgrav/grav` core package is not affected.

  • `grav-plugin-api` <= 1.0.19
  • `grav-plugin-login` <= 3.9.2
  • `grav-plugin-admin` <= 1.10.55 / 1.11.0-beta.5

Verified end-to-end on a stock Grav 2.0.19 install with api 1.0.19, admin 1.10.55, login 3.9.2.

### Details
Inheritance is live authorization semantics — both layers check group access before falling through:

  • core `system/src/Grav/Common/User/Traits/UserTrait.php:102-117` — `authorize()` consults `groups.{name}.access.{action}` first;
  • core `system/src/Grav/Common/Flex/Types/Users/UserObject.php:311-317` — `$this->getGroups()->authorize()`;
  • core `system/src/Grav/Common/Flex/Types/UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75` — a group carrying `admin.super` authorizes every action for its members;
  • api `classes/Api/PermissionResolver.php:145-175` — merged the same way.

The guards only look at the account's own map:

  • api `UsersController::update()` (`UsersController.php:1008`) — and `password` sits outside the field-level whitelist (:1069-1080), so passing the guard means direct account takeover;
  • api `UsersController::delete()` (:1160);
  • api `requireNotSuperTarget()` (:1584-1595), reused by seven endpoints including `createApiKey()` (:1474) and `disable2fa()` (:1421);
  • classic admin `AdminController::saveUser()` (`AdminController.php:336-341`);
  • login plugin's user-unlock row action (`login.php:1857`, helper at :1885).

The API plugin's own `UsersController` already contains a group-aware, login-state-independent resolver — `effectiveAccessMap()` (:1864) and `userHasEffectiveAccess()` (:1830) — but it is wired only to the users-list filter, never to the security guards.

A related guard in the same plugin, `authorizeApiKeyTarget()` (`api.php:360-363`), calls `$target->authorize('admin.super')` on an account loaded from storage. Such an account is not `authenticated` (the property is never persisted), so `authorize()` returns false for every action and this guard never fires for any super target, group-based or not. It is fixed in the same change, and it is the reason the fix reads access maps directly rather than routing the other guards through `authorize()`, which would make them fail open.

Preconditions are configuration-realistic: the bundled `group.yaml` blueprint natively offers the full super permission matrix, so "a super-granting group whose members' own access is empty" is a designed-in arrangement. Group assignment is super-only on every write path, so the attacker cannot manufacture the victim — the victim is precisely the kind of account the guards exist to protect.

### PoC
Setup: `user/config/groups.yaml` defines a group `admins` granting `admin.super` / `api.super`; account `boss` has own access of only `site.login` and `groups: [admins]`. Logging in as `boss` reaches the admin dashboard — effective super via inheritance.

Actor: `usermgr` with `api.access` + `api.users.write` (not super by any measure).

# control — directly-flagged super account: the guard fires
PATCH /api/v1/users/admin
{"password": "Should-fail-123!"}
-> 403 "Only super-admins can modify super-admin accounts."

# attack — group-inherited super account: the guard is blind
PATCH /api/v1/users/boss
{"password": "Owned-passw0rd!"}
-> 200 (account object returned; password hash rewritten)

Then log in as `boss` with `Owned-passw0rd!` → full super-admin session.

### Impact
- User-manager roles can take over group-super accounts: full site configuration, plugin install (RCE), all data.
- Same root cause, other variants: delete group-super accounts, mint persistent API keys in their name, or strip their 2FA — each useful in multi-step intrusions even where a password change would be noticed.
- Any site using groups to grant admin/super — a standard Grav pattern, and the only practical model for directory-backed logins such as login-ldap — exposes all such accounts to every user manager.

### Patches
Fixed in `grav-plugin-api`, `grav-plugin-login`, and `grav-plugin-admin`. The target guards now resolve super across the account's own access map and every group it belongs to.

### Credits
Reported by @1K0CT.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav-plugin-api< 1.0.20
getgrav/grav-plugin-admin< 1.10.56
getgrav/grav-plugin-login< 3.9.3
1.0.20
1.10.56
3.9.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-api
Corregida 1.0.20 — —
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-admin
Corregida 1.10.56 — —
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-login
Corregida 3.9.3 — —
Versiones corregidas1.0.201.10.563.9.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-vv8m-jqpm-38x4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.