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Advisory · GitHub · Go · go.qbee.io/agent

GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR

qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versióncommit eb7875f
Exposición3 dDesde la divulgación, 16 nov 2026, 5:35 p. m.
Detección25 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
16 nov 26
17 nov 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:

strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)

This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.

The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.

Details

Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:

  • `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`

Affected repository:

  • `qbee-io/qbee-agent`

Affected files:

  • `app/utils/tar.go`
  • Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`

The vulnerable extraction code:

  • `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)

if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf("tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s", targetPath, destdirClean)
}

The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:

  • `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
case tar.TypeReg:
    targetFile, err := os.Create(targetPath)

Docker Compose build contexts reach this extractor:

  • `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go:238-270`

The context archive is downloaded and then unpacked into the compose project context directory with `utils.UnpackTar`.

Archive source and role evidence:

  • `app/configuration/compose.go:14` defines the Docker Compose build context as the remote configuration field `Context string`.
  • `app/configuration/compose.go:26` enables this path with `UseContext`.
  • `app/configuration/file_manager.go:240-246` and `app/configuration/file_manager.go:281-287` show that context sources are resolved either from `file://` local files or from the Qbee file-manager API.
  • Qbee's Docker Compose documentation lists "Build Context" as a Docker Compose configuration option: https://docs.qbee.io/configuration-docker-compose.html
  • Qbee's RBAC documentation separates `configuration:manage` from `files:manage`, and maps "Configure -> Modify configuration" to `configuration:manage` while "Files manager -> Write access" maps to `files:manage`: https://docs.qbee.io/account-users-and-roles.html
  • Qbee's CI/CD documentation describes using a dedicated Qbee user with a role restricted to configuration changes to push and commit deployment configuration: https://docs.qbee.io/tutorial-iot-container-deployment-with-ci-cd-devops.html

Trust-boundary requirement:

  • The vulnerable primitive is clear: qbee-agent writes a regular file outside the intended context extraction directory.
  • The security boundary is present when the archive supplier is less privileged than the local qbee-agent process and is not supposed to write arbitrary sibling files in qbee-agent's Docker Compose cache/project area.
  • The public code and documentation support this boundary for tenants that delegate configuration and/or file-manager access to limited users or CI automation.
  • If a deployment allows only full device/fleet administrators to provide Docker Compose context archives, the finding should be treated as hardening for that deployment.

PoC

Two failing regression tests add.

The utility-level test proves the extractor bug directly:

  • `app/utils/tar_test.go:132`
  • `Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass`

Command:

wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/utils -run Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass -count=1 -v'

Observed result:

=== RUN   Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass
    tar_test.go:169: expected unpackTar to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
    tar_test.go:174: path traversal: payload was written outside destPath at /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt; got "zip-slip-sibling-prefix"
--- FAIL: Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass (0.00s)
FAIL

The Docker Compose bundle-path test proves reachability through `Compose.getContext()`:

  • `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:13`
  • `Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip`

Command:

wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/configuration -run Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip -count=1 -v'

Observed result:

=== RUN   Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip
    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:66: expected compose context unpack to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:75: compose context path traversal wrote outside context dir at /tmp/.../cache/docker_compose/project-a/context-outside/payload.txt; got "compose-context-zip-slip"
--- FAIL: Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip (0.00s)
FAIL

Impact

An attacker-controlled Docker Compose build context archive can create directories and regular files outside qbee-agent's intended context extraction directory, with qbee-agent process privileges.

The demonstrated impact is constrained path traversal:

  • It can write sibling-prefix paths such as `cache/docker_compose/<project>/context-outside/payload.txt`.
  • It does not demonstrate writing arbitrary paths such as `/etc/passwd`; those do not pass the current string-prefix check.
  • It can corrupt or alter files in nearby qbee-agent Docker Compose cache/project paths if their cleaned path shares the destination prefix.
  • It may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, depending on the project/cache layout.

This report does not claim direct RCE.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
go.qbee.io/agent< 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849
0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogo.qbee.io/agent
Corregida commit eb7875f — —
Versiones corregidascommit eb7875f
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129237
Otrahttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr
Otrahttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/pull/148
Otrahttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/commit/eb7875f0a849cb33325956d0b75e27061d7a7fa3
Otrahttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent
Otrahttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/releases/tag/2026.41

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