GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR
qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.
The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.
Details
Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:
- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`
Affected repository:
- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`
Affected files:
- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`
The vulnerable extraction code:
- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)
if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
return fmt.Errorf("tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s", targetPath, destdirClean)
}The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:
- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`
case tar.TypeDir:
if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
case tar.TypeReg:
targetFile, err := os.Create(targetPath)Docker Compose build contexts reach this extractor:
- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go:238-270`
The context archive is downloaded and then unpacked into the compose project context directory with `utils.UnpackTar`.
Archive source and role evidence:
- `app/configuration/compose.go:14` defines the Docker Compose build context as the remote configuration field `Context string`.
- `app/configuration/compose.go:26` enables this path with `UseContext`.
- `app/configuration/file_manager.go:240-246` and `app/configuration/file_manager.go:281-287` show that context sources are resolved either from `file://` local files or from the Qbee file-manager API.
- Qbee's Docker Compose documentation lists "Build Context" as a Docker Compose configuration option: https://docs.qbee.io/configuration-docker-compose.html
- Qbee's RBAC documentation separates `configuration:manage` from `files:manage`, and maps "Configure -> Modify configuration" to `configuration:manage` while "Files manager -> Write access" maps to `files:manage`: https://docs.qbee.io/account-users-and-roles.html
- Qbee's CI/CD documentation describes using a dedicated Qbee user with a role restricted to configuration changes to push and commit deployment configuration: https://docs.qbee.io/tutorial-iot-container-deployment-with-ci-cd-devops.html
Trust-boundary requirement:
- The vulnerable primitive is clear: qbee-agent writes a regular file outside the intended context extraction directory.
- The security boundary is present when the archive supplier is less privileged than the local qbee-agent process and is not supposed to write arbitrary sibling files in qbee-agent's Docker Compose cache/project area.
- The public code and documentation support this boundary for tenants that delegate configuration and/or file-manager access to limited users or CI automation.
- If a deployment allows only full device/fleet administrators to provide Docker Compose context archives, the finding should be treated as hardening for that deployment.
PoC
Two failing regression tests add.
The utility-level test proves the extractor bug directly:
- `app/utils/tar_test.go:132`
- `Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass`
Command:
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/utils -run Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass -count=1 -v'Observed result:
=== RUN Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass
tar_test.go:169: expected unpackTar to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
tar_test.go:174: path traversal: payload was written outside destPath at /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt; got "zip-slip-sibling-prefix"
--- FAIL: Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass (0.00s)
FAILThe Docker Compose bundle-path test proves reachability through `Compose.getContext()`:
- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:13`
- `Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip`
Command:
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/configuration -run Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip -count=1 -v'Observed result:
=== RUN Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip
bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:66: expected compose context unpack to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:75: compose context path traversal wrote outside context dir at /tmp/.../cache/docker_compose/project-a/context-outside/payload.txt; got "compose-context-zip-slip"
--- FAIL: Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip (0.00s)
FAILImpact
An attacker-controlled Docker Compose build context archive can create directories and regular files outside qbee-agent's intended context extraction directory, with qbee-agent process privileges.
The demonstrated impact is constrained path traversal:
- It can write sibling-prefix paths such as `cache/docker_compose/<project>/context-outside/payload.txt`.
- It does not demonstrate writing arbitrary paths such as `/etc/passwd`; those do not pass the current string-prefix check.
- It can corrupt or alter files in nearby qbee-agent Docker Compose cache/project paths if their cleaned path shares the destination prefix.
- It may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, depending on the project/cache layout.
This report does not claim direct RCE.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogo.qbee.io/agent |
Corregida | commit eb7875f | — | — |
commit eb7875fArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129237https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghrhttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/pull/148https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/commit/eb7875f0a849cb33325956d0b75e27061d7a7fa3https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agenthttps://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/releases/tag/2026.41Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
