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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · russh

GHSA-W3JG-PJXF-73P4

Russh: Missing X25519 zero-point validation in hybrid ML-KEM key exchange

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -40 d de la divulgación
Exposición50 dDesde la divulgación, 30 sept 2026, 6:26 p. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.63.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 ago 26
30 sept 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 ago 26
13 sept 26
6 oct 26
28 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.63.0 russh · -40 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W3JG-PJXF-73P4 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Vulnerability

The hybrid ML-KEM 768 + X25519 key exchange implementation in `russh/src/kex/hybrid_mlkem.rs` does not validate that the remote peer's X25519 public key is not the zero point (all-zero 32-byte value). This allows a remote peer to force the X25519 contribution to the combined shared secret to zero, reducing the hybrid KEX to a single-algorithm exchange.

Affected code at HEAD (v0.62.4, commit 0089c89):

Server-side (`server_dh`, lines 92-93):

let mut c_pk1 = MontgomeryPoint([0; 32]);
c_pk1.0.copy_from_slice(c_pk1_bytes);
// No zero-point check - proceeds to: let k_cl = s_secret * c_pk1;

Client-side (`compute_shared_secret`, lines 154-155):

let mut s_pk1 = MontgomeryPoint([0; 32]);
s_pk1.0.copy_from_slice(s_pk1_bytes);
// No zero-point check - proceeds to: let k_cl = x25519_secret * s_pk1;

Root Cause

Commit a7fc1eb (2026-07-22, "fix mpint encoding and validate curve25519 keys") added zero-point validation to the standalone Curve25519 KEX in `russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs` at two locations:
- `server_dh` line 77: `if client_pubkey.0 == [0u8; 32] { return Err(crate::Error::Kex); }`
- `compute_shared_secret` line 122: `if remote_pubkey.0 == [0u8; 32] { return Err(crate::Error::Kex); }`

The same X25519 scalar multiplication pattern appears in `hybrid_mlkem.rs`, but the fix was not applied there.

Proof of Concept

A malicious SSH client negotiating `mlkem768x25519-sha256` can send a KEX_HYBRID_INIT message containing a valid ML-KEM 768 encapsulation key followed by 32 zero bytes as the X25519 component.

When the server computes `k_cl = s_secret * c_pk1`, the result is the zero point regardless of the server's secret scalar. The combined shared secret `K = SHA-256(k_pq || k_cl)` then depends only on the ML-KEM component. The same attack works in reverse against a client connecting to a malicious server.

The zero X25519 public key passes all existing validation (the length check on line 78 succeeds since 32 bytes is correct). No panic or crash occurs - the exchange completes successfully with a weakened shared secret.

Impact

The purpose of hybrid key exchange is defense-in-depth: if either the classical algorithm (X25519) or the post-quantum algorithm (ML-KEM 768) is broken, the combined secret remains secure. By injecting a zero X25519 public key, an attacker eliminates the classical contribution entirely, reducing security to depend solely on ML-KEM.

This matters in two scenarios:
1. If ML-KEM 768 is later found to have a weakness (the explicit threat model hybrid KEX is designed to mitigate), sessions where the X25519 component was zeroed out lose their fallback protection.
2. An active network attacker who can intercept KEX could downgrade the hybrid exchange to effectively single-algorithm security without either peer detecting it.

The severity is MEDIUM rather than HIGH because the ML-KEM component still provides strong security today, and an active attacker who can modify KEX messages can already perform other attacks unless strict KEX is negotiated.

Suggested Fix

Add zero-point checks in `hybrid_mlkem.rs` matching the ones in `curve25519.rs`:

// In server_dh, after line 93:
let mut c_pk1 = MontgomeryPoint([0; 32]);
c_pk1.0.copy_from_slice(c_pk1_bytes);
if c_pk1.0 == [0u8; 32] {
    return Err(Error::Kex);
}

// In compute_shared_secret, after line 155:
let mut s_pk1 = MontgomeryPoint([0; 32]);
s_pk1.0.copy_from_slice(s_pk1_bytes);
if s_pk1.0 == [0u8; 32] {
    return Err(Error::Kex);
}

Ideally, also validate against the other small-subgroup points on Curve25519 (there are a small number of low-order points that also yield a zero shared secret), matching the comprehensive validation OpenSSH performs.

AI tooling

AI assistancewas used for the code audit and for drafting this report. The finding was manually verified against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are my own.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
russh< 0.63.0
0.63.0
0.65.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iorussh
Corregida 0.63.0 -40 d 0.65.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.63.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102824
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-w3jg-pjxf-73p4
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/8da8967f196472576b1565d518a0ed60fce60f0c
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh
Otrahttps://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.63.0

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