GHSA-W3Q2-8F3P-C2MW
IDOR in mylist.php exposes other users' private list configurations
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-W3Q2-8F3P-C2MW divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Any authenticated user who can open the Lists module can read the configuration of other users' private lists by passing a list UUID to `mylist.php`.
The read path only validates the organization and never the owner (`lst_usr_id`) or the private flag (`lst_global`), so private list configurations are disclosed across users.
The vulnerability is read-only and requires knowing the non-enumerable UUID; it affects the supported v5.0.17 release and current master (6.0.0-Beta1).
Details
`mylist.php` loads the configuration selected by the `list_uuid` parameter and never checks who owns it:
`modules/groups-roles/mylist.php` (v5.0.17 line 66, same call in current master):
$getListUuid = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'list_uuid', 'uuid');
$list = new ListConfiguration($gDb);
$list->readDataByUuid($getListUuid);`src/Roles/Entity/ListConfiguration.php` overrides `readData()` and only enforces the organization:
protected function readData(string $sqlWhereCondition, array $queryParams = array()): bool
{
if (parent::readData($sqlWhereCondition, $queryParams)) {
// check if list belongs to this organization
if ($this->getValue('lst_org_id') > 0 && $this->getValue('lst_org_id') !== $GLOBALS['gCurrentOrgId']) {
throw new Exception('List ' . $this->getValue('lst_uuid') . ' belongs to another organization.');
}
return true;
}
return false;
}There is no comparison against `lst_usr_id` or `lst_global` on this read path. The list selector in the same page does filter by them (`WHERE lst_org_id = ? AND (lst_usr_id = ? OR lst_global = true)`): the UI hides the list, the endpoint serves it.
Proof of concept
- Use two accounts of the same organization. As the victim, save a list configuration with "visible for all users" unchecked; it is stored with `lst_global = 0` and the victim as `lst_usr_id`. As the attacker, sign in as a regular member without special roles, with `groups_roles_edit_lists = 1` (the value in the shipped demo data).
- Configure a unique filter value on the victim's list (in the lab: `IDOR_CANARY_7731`) so the disclosure can be told apart from page defaults.
- As the attacker, request the victim's list by UUID (obtainable from the victim's own session URL or a shared list page):
```http
GET /modules/groups-roles/mylist.php?list_uuid=a4889bdb-e294-46a6-a76f-4456707012e3 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100
Cookie: <attacker session cookie>
```
The response is `200 OK` and the page carries the private list name and its full configuration (selected profile fields, sort directions and conditions); the canary `IDOR_CANARY_7731` appears in the response, which proves the foreign configuration was loaded.
- Negative control: the same request with a random UUID also returns `200 OK` but does not contain the canary.
Impact
Any authenticated user with access to the Lists module is an attacker: with `groups_roles_edit_lists = 1` every signed-in user, with `2` or `3` users holding `rol_edit_user`. Victims are any users with private list configurations in the same organization, including administrators. The boundary crossed is the user level: the configuration belongs to another account and is never shared with the attacker.
The demonstrated effect is read-only disclosure of the list name, the selected profile fields, the sort order and the filter conditions. Filters can describe how members are selected (for example a condition over the last name), so internal selection criteria may be revealed. Member records themselves are not exposed, and the list cannot be modified or deleted from this path.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistadmidio/admidio |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-w3q2-8f3p-c2mwLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
