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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/zzet/gortex

GHSA-W42C-H7HR-F67P

Gortex: Arbitrary file write / repo-confinement escape in `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline` MCP tools → code execution

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -145 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 3:36 p. m.
Detección14 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.55.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
27 jun 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
27 jun 26
3 ago 26
8 sept 26
15 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.55.0 github.com/zzet/gortex · -145 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W42C-H7HR-F67P divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
Gortex is an MCP server exposing `write_file`, `edit_file`, and `move_inline` tools. `resolveFilePath` exempts absolute paths from confinement, and the write handlers — unlike `read_file` / `get_symbol_source` — never call `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`. A single MCP `write_file` call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, outside every indexed repo root (`AtomicWriteFile`'s `MkdirAll` auto-creates missing parents). Writing `~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`, `.git/hooks/pre-commit`, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project's own `SECURITY.md` invariant *"File-path resolution is confined to indexed repository roots"*

### Affected
`internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go` (+ `tools_move_inline.go`), HEAD `28fa017` (v0.53.0).
CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name/Path) → CWE-94 (code execution).

### Vulnerable code
`internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62` `resolveFilePath` exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at `:793` (`AtomicWriteFile`, `write_file`) and `:676` (`edit_file`) run with no `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`. The asymmetry is the bug: `read_file` (`:940`) and `get_symbol_source` do call `guardSymlinkWithinRepo`; the write path does not.

### PoC (executed)
The PoC (`internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go`, package `mcp`) builds the server via the repo's own `newSingleRepoServer(t)` harness and invokes the real `srv.handleWriteFile` through the genuine `mcplib.CallToolRequest` shape:

=== RUN   TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot
  indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo
  handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50
  PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes "OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root"
  RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -> "echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file"
  VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 ("It does not write to source files")
--- PASS  (go test ok)

The test asserts the handler did not return `IsError` and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)

### Impact
`write_file` / `edit_file` are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can — startup/hook/cron files → arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property `SECURITY.md` promises) is broken on the write path.

### Severity
High — CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` ≈ 8.x. `UI:R` reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file → execute on next trigger), so `I:H` + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower — but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.

### Remediation
Apply `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline`, identically to `read_file` / `get_symbol_source`. Confinement must cover the write path.

### Dedup / freshness (re-verified live)
`gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories` → `[]` (none). `gh search prs/issues` for `resolveFilePath` / `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` / symlink / traversal / confinement → 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). `resolveFilePath` / `guardSymlinkWithinRepo` are gortex-own code (not vendored). Fresh at HEAD `28fa017`.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/zzet/gortex< 0.55.0
0.55.0
v0.64.11
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/zzet/gortex
Corregida v0.55.0 -145 d v0.64.11 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.55.0v0.55.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62964
Otrahttps://github.com/zzet/gortex/security/advisories/GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p
Otrahttps://github.com/zzet/gortex/commit/5ba2f066dd6dcd726c4e61b74851862dc596d994
Otrahttps://github.com/zzet/gortex
Otrahttps://github.com/zzet/gortex/releases/tag/v0.55.0

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