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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · surrealdb

GHSA-W5V9-JC5F-5RMC

Cross-tenant access for system users through the Surreal-NS / Surreal-DB headers and the RPC use method

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CVSS 3.1
9.6
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -4 d de la divulgación
Exposición54 dDesde la divulgación, 28 sept 2026, 6:15 a. m.
Detección53 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
La próxima reunión de cambios es tuya. Llévala.Le tengo más miedo a esta CVE que a los lunes.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.3.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
24 sept 26
28 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 sept 26
9 oct 26
23 oct 26
7 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.3.0 surrealdb · -4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W5V9-JC5F-5RMC divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

A system user (created with `DEFINE USER … ON DATABASE` or `ON NAMESPACE`) scoped to one tenant could read, create, modify, and delete rows in another tenant, and read the value of a `DEFINE PARAM` there.

The selected namespace/database came from caller-controlled input and was never compared with the level the caller authenticated at. On HTTP `/sql`, the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers set it independently of the credentials. Over WebSocket `/rpc`, the `use` method set it unconditionally. A query-time scope check existed, but it applied only to record users, so namespace- and database-level users were never checked. After the switch, the caller's identity stayed bound to their own tenant, but queries ran against the foreign one, where the only remaining gate was the table's `PERMISSIONS` clause. So a table declared `PERMISSIONS FULL`, or with a predicate the caller happened to satisfy, admitted the request. That is a common table shape when the namespace/database itself is treated as the tenant boundary.

The same root cause was reported through several paths, each published as its own advisory and all fixed in 3.3.0:

  • GHSA-2v9j-645m-pcrq https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-2v9j-645m-pcrq: the `USE` statement
  • GHSA-vx2p-7hhm-wv62 https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2p-7hhm-wv62: the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers with Basic authentication
  • GHSA-3vw5-j55x-486h https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-3vw5-j55x-486h: `RETURN … FETCH`, for record users
Impact

What an attacker can do:

  • With a database- or namespace-level user in any one tenant, select another tenant through the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers or the RPC `use` method. They can then read, create, update, and delete rows in its tables whose `PERMISSIONS` allow the operation, such as `PERMISSIONS FULL`.
  • Read the value of a `DEFINE PARAM` in that tenant under the same conditions.

What it can't do:

  • Reach any tenant without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance. This is not an unauthenticated bypass.
  • Read or write a table whose relevant `PERMISSIONS` clause denies the operation, including `PERMISSIONS NONE` (the `DEFINE TABLE` default).
  • Pass IAM-gated operations such as `INFO FOR DB`, or change roles.
  • Affect single-tenant deployments, or callers that already hold instance-wide (root) scope.
Patches

A request can no longer select a namespace/database outside the caller's authenticated level. The check applies to the `USE` statement, the RPC `use` method, and HTTP sessions built from the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers. Root can select any namespace/database, and a namespace user any database in their namespace. Database and record users can select only their own namespace/database. Anonymous callers remain governed by table `PERMISSIONS`.

The query-time scope checks now apply to every scoped principal, not only record users. They also cover record fetches and the document write pipeline, so a read or write in a foreign tenant is refused however the session reached it.

  • Versions 3.3.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds

Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:

  • On shared instances, use separate deployments, not namespace/database boundaries, to isolate tenants. Until you upgrade, issue namespace-, database-, and record-level credentials only to parties trusted with every tenant on the instance.
  • Prefer a `PERMISSIONS WHERE` clause that checks the caller's identity, such as `$auth` or a token claim, over `PERMISSIONS FULL`. This reduces exposure but does not restore the boundary.
References
  • SurrealQL Documentation — USE https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/use
  • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table
  • SurrealDB Documentation — Security and authentication https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/authentication
  • `fix(core): enforce tenant boundary on USE / process_use` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(server): confine Surreal-NS/Surreal-DB header context to the auth level` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(core): confine record users to their own tenant on the write path` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(doc): re-verify record-auth namespace/database scope in the document pipeline` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
Acknowledgements

Thank you to thaidn https://github.com/thaidn for reporting this issue.

Credits
  • Reported by Calif.io, in collaboration with Anthropic.
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.7/ 10Muy alto
Vector 8.7 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
surrealdb< 3.3.0
3.3.0
4.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosurrealdb
Corregida 3.3.0 -4 d 4.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-w5v9-jc5f-5rmc

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.