GHSA-W6X2-F5M4-XW82
fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v0.74.5 | github.com/junegunn/fzf · -39 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-W6X2-F5M4-XW82 divulgada · CVSS 7 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories | Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`bin/fzf-tmux` fails to validate layout size values given in the *attached* form (e.g. `-l50`). For `-l`/`-u` these values reach bash arithmetic expansion (`$(( max - size ))`), where an operand like `a[$(cmd)]` executes `cmd` as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (`-x/-y/-w/-h/-p`) into an unquoted `tmux popup ... $opt ...` invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as `-e BASH_ENV=<path>` (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing `$BASH_ENV`).
### Reporter / Credits:
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/
Details
In `bin/fzf-tmux` (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (`^[0-9%,]+$` / `^[A-Z]$`) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
size="${arg:2}" # no validation
else
if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then # only separate form validatedFor `-l` and `-u`, `swap` is non-empty (lines 68/75), so `size` reaches arithmetic evaluation:
- line 120: `size=$((max - size))` (non-percent values)
- line 102: `opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%"` (percent, tmux >= 3.2)
- line 108: `opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))"` (percent, tmux < 3.2)
Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so `a[$(command)]` runs `command`. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).
Second sink (same root cause): `opt` is used unquoted at line 236 (`tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf"`) and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. `-e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script`.
PoC
Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub `fzf` on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]' # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%' # line 102/108 sink (percent)
$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): `bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'`.
Impact
Local command injection (CWE-78). `fzf-tmux` argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. `fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"`); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain `size` to `[0-9]+` before any `$((...))`, and build the tmux invocation as an array (`"${opt_parts[@]}"`) instead of unquoted `$opt`.
Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.
Exploitability in practice
Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (`-l`/`-u`). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and `bin/fzf-tmux` has been superseded by the built-in `--tmux`/`--popup` option since 0.53.0.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/junegunn/fzf |
Corregida | v0.74.5 | -39 d | v0.75.0 no afectada |
0.74.5v0.74.5Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121716https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/commit/f126ff29549e0983f571fbc32dddcfbede251aa7https://github.com/junegunn/fzfhttps://github.com/junegunn/fzf/releases/tag/v0.74.5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
